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A STUDY OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
METHODOLOGY: CONTRACT
MODIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE TWO
ROBERT A. HILLMANt

A goal of the Un/form Commercial Code is to provide rules that
respondto commercialrealityso that the intentions of contractingparties will be effectuated To meet this challenge the UC.C. was written
to allow both certainty andflexibility. In this Article, ProfessorHillman examines the Code provisionsgoverning contract modifications.
Through a series of hypotheticalproblemshe explores the methodology
used by the U C C. in attempting to achieve a properbalance between
stability andflexibiliy in contract modfcation law. He concludes that
the Code has not been successful in achievingits goals in this area. The
various sections relatingto contract modfcation are often ambiguous,
confusing, and even conflicting. ProfessorHillman attempts to counter
these Code inadequacies by suggesting solutions consistent with the
Codepolicy of enforcingfreely made modfifcation agreements.

Balancing the need for flexibility and stability in the rules governing our
commercial world was a major challenge in drafting the Uniform Commercial
Code.' In response to criticism of prior commercial statutes concerning their
rigidity, complexity, and obsolescence, 2 much of the Code is couched in broad

language3 to enable courts to develop the law in light of new circumstances
and practices.4 Critics of prior commercial legislation also noted, however,
that the absence of sufficient specificity in the legislation would render the
Code ambiguous and ineffectual.5 Specific rules in the Code reflect the need

for certainty to enable commercial parties to plan their transactions.6 The
t Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. A.B. 1969, University of Rochester, J.D. 1972, Cornell University. I wish to thank Clifford J. Calhoun, David G. Epstein, and
William F. Young for their helpful suggestions. All mistakes are, of course, my own.
1. Hereinafter referred to as U.C.C. or Code.
2. See, eg., Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291,
305; Llewellyn, Why a Commerical Code? 22 TENN. L. REv. 779, 779 (1953). For a discussion of
the arguments surrounding the codification issue, see NEw YORK LAW REvIsION COMMISSION, 1
STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Doc. No. 65(A), 41 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
STUDY].

3. See, ag., U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-302; Azevedo v. Minister, 86 Nev. 576, 579, 471 P.2d 661,
663 (1970).
4. One of the underlying "purposes and policies" of the Code is "to permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties." U.C.C.
§ I-102(2)(b). The need for flexibility in drafting is discussed in Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 759-61 (1969); Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial
Code: U.C C Section 1-103 and "Code" Methodology, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 655, 65657 (1977); Jackson & Peters, Questfor Uncertainty A ProposalforFlexible Resolution of Inherent
Conflicts Between Article 2 andArticle9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907, 90708 (1978).
5. See STUDY, supra note 2, at 58, 63-64.
6. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 2-207, 2-209(2), 2-209(3).
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Code drafters directed in section 1-102(1) that courts "liberally construe and

apply" the Code "to promote its underlying purposes and policies."'7 This section enables courts to construe Code language either broadly or narrowly to
conform with Code purposes and policies.8
The tension between drafting legislation that is both sufficiently broad to
provide flexibility and at the same time sufficiently specific to provide certainty
and stability9 is reflected in the approach to contract modification taken by
Article 2 of the U.C.C.' 0 Contracting parties often attempt to adjust their
agreements to respond to changes in economic conditions, changes in the law,
or changes of mind.11 Accordingly, Code modification law should facilitate
the freedom of contracting parties to adjust to change. At the same time, however, contracting parties also desire stability in their contracts 12 so that they
can enter into other agreements in reliance upon their contracts. The Code
approach to contract modification should ensure that the parties' expectations
are protected. 13

The U.C.C. contract modification provisions clearly display the tension
between drafting for flexibility and certainty. For example, to enable contracting parties to alter their agreements freely, section 2-209(1) rejects the
common-law preexisting duty doctrine that bars the enforcement of contract
modifications in the absence of additional consideration supplied by the party
seeking to enforce the modification.14 Whereas the preexisting duty rule provided some protection to a contracting party from attempts by the other party
to coerce modification by threats of nonperformance, the Code attempts to

police against such overreaching in the negotiation of modifications through
the obligation of good faith performance found in section 1-203.15 Section 2209(4), to cite another example of broad drafting, enables parties asserting the
7. Section 1-102(1) has been interpreted to mean that the Code displaces all other commercial law and that all answers to commercial problems, whether or not explicitly addressed by the
Code, are found within its provisions by referring to appropriate purposes and policies. See
Hawkland, supra note 2, at 292; Hillman, supra note 4, at 656-58. This methodology has been
called "true Code methodology." Id
8. U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1.
9. "The learning from all of the great commercial lawyers. . . has always been that the
legal system must draw on the commercial sense of the transaction and the parties, in a process
that must have boundaries while retaining elasticity as well." Jackson & Peters, supra note 4, at
985.
10. See generall, Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical,Neoclassical,and RelationalContract Law, 72 Nw. L. REv. 854 (1978).
11. See, e.g., J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 43 (2d ed. 1980); 2
WILLISTON ON SALES § 12-4, at 8 (4th ed. A. Squiante & J. Fonseca 1974) [hereinafter cited as
WILLISTON]; Levie, The Interpretationof Contractsin New York Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 10 N.Y. L.F. 350, 355 (1964).
12. See, eg., Macneil, supra note 10, at 859-61.
13. By encouraging the formation of contracts, society is benefited through the specialization
and efficiencies that are the product of the contract arrangement. See Fuller & Perdue, The Rellance Interest in ContractDamages: Part 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61 (1936). See also Hartzler, The
Business and Economic Functions of the Law of Contract Damages, 6 AM. Bus. L.J. 387, 392
(1968).
14. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) provides: "An agreement modifying a contract within this Article
needs no consideration to be binding."
15. Fraud and duress rules supplement the Code through § 1-103. See note 183 infra. These
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enforceability of a modification that does not meet the formal requirements of
section 2-209(2) or (3) to prevail on waiver grounds. 16 In contrast to these
flexible rules, section 2-209(2) contains the specific mandate that signed writings which exclude oral modification cannot be modified or rescinded except

in writing,' 7 and section 2-209(3) contains an additional statute of frauds requirement applicable in modification cases.' 8

Unfortunately, the Code is not very successful in achieving a proper balance between flexibility and stability in contract modification law. In response

to some issues of contract modification the Code has opted for an overly broad

20
approach;' 9 in response to other issues the Code is too inflexible. Some of
the Code's broad language is too ambiguous to be helpful, 2 1 and some of the
specific rules are poorly drafted and confusing. 22 Furthermore, some sections

of the Code seem to conflict with others.23 As a result, the overall effect of the
Code on modification law is not to foster, but to impede the enforcement of
freely made modification agreements. 24 The weaknesses of the Code in this
area highlight the importance of the section 1-102(1) reference to purposes and

policies in interpreting the Code. Only by freely applying the purposes and
policies of Code modification law to the Code provisions can a proper balance

be achieved between flexibility and certainty in this important area of comdoctrines also may be employed to police against overreaching in the modification context. See
generally Hillman, supra note 4.
In an earlier article on contract modification under the Code, this author concluded that the
absence of explicit language prohibiting the enforcement of unfairly procured modifications and
the lack of sufficient guidance on which modifications should be enforced have resulted in an
inadequate approach to the problem of overreaching in contract modification. See Hillman, Policing ContractModfications Under the U C C.: Good Faith andthe Doctrine ofEconomic Duress, 64
IOWA L. Rav. 849, 901-02 (1979).
16. U.C.C. § 2-209(4) provides: "Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not
satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver." See text accompanying notes 170-203 infra.
The purpose of§ 2-209 is "to protect and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments." U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment I.
17. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) provides: "A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between
merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by
the other party." See text accompanying notes 127-139 infra.
The New York Law Revision Commission commented that § 2-209(2) "permit(s) the parties
to add another formality" and hinted that the subsection was counter to the basic policy of §2-209
to reduce the technicalities of modification formation and enforceability. 1 STUDY, supra note 2,
at 640.
18. U.C.C. § 2-209(3) provides: "The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this
Article (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions." See
text accompanying notes 140-153 infra.
19. See generally text accompanying notes 111-126 infra.
20. See generally text accompanying notes 140-153 infra.
21. See generally text accompanying notes 170-193 infra.
22. See generally text accompanying notes 127-153 infra.
23. See generally text accompanying notes 166-167 infra.
24. "Because modification and waiver provide a large portion of the disputes litigated in
commercial cases, this section is of enormous practical importance. Unfortunately, it will present
difficulties which will lead to extensive litigation, perhaps unavoidably because of its subject matter." Levie, supra note 11, at 355.
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mercial law.25
This Article will analyze contract modification law under Article 2 of the
Code. It will highlight the drafting weaknesses of the contract modification
sections of the Code and will suggest solutions to the problems of interpretation consistent with the methodology of section 1-102(1). The frame of reference for this discussion is a series of hypothetical problems involving a simple
sales contract between two merchants. 26 Part I of the Article investigates modification formation, and Part II examines the enforceability of a modification.
I.

MODIFICATION FORMATION

The first task in examining contract modification under the Code is to
determine when the special rules of contract modification apply to a particular
dispute. Only when the parties have intended to enter into an agreement that
alters their original contract should the special rules of contract modification
apply.
A. Modyfcation Formation v. Contract Interpretation
A contracting party's attempt to enforce an existing agreement may be
confused with an attempt to modify the agreement, or, conversely, a modification agreement may be incorrectly treated as part of the original contract. The
by the Code's failure to define adequately the term
confusion is exacerbated
"modification."' 27 Proper framing of the issue may influence the tenor of the
litigation and its outcome.
PROBLEM ONE
Selco Manufacturing Company and Buyco Ice Cream Company
enter into a written agreementfor the sale by Selco to Buyco offive
slushfreezers,usedto crush icefor the totalpriceof $10,000. Theprice
provision, though vagueo worded,appearsto include aprice escalation
clause that wouldpermitprice increases to reflect the market price on
the date of delivery. On the date of delivery Selco seeks an increase in
thepurchasepricebasedupon the marketprice of the slushfreezers on
that date. Buyco refuses topay, andSelco bringan actionfor breach of
contract.
Contracting parties are mindful that circumstances may change during
the performance of their contracts. Accordingly, they often make their agreements flexible so that they can adjust to change. 28 One method of achieving
flexibility is to provide that a contract term will be completed at a later time by
25. Efforts to modify an agreement often occur, see 2 WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 12-4, at 8,
and are of "immense practical significance." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 43; see
also Levie, supra note 11, at 355.
26. The parties are merchants under U.C.C. § 2-104(1) in all problems except Problem Ten
in which the buyer is a consumer. See notes 127-39 and accompanying text infra.
27. See generally text accompanying notes 33-41 infra.
28. See Macneil, supra note 10, at 865-73.
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referring at that later time to an objective standard such as the market price at
the date of delivery.29 Another method of ensuring flexibility is to agree that a

contract term will be completed at a later time after further negotiations of the
parties. 30 When contracting parties have made their agreement flexible by ref-

erence to objective standards or by leaving gaps for further negotiation, 3 1 and
one party then refuses to abide by the standard or to agree to fill the gap, the

controversy involves examination and interpretation of the original agreean agreement to modify a contract has
ment, not determination of whether
32

been made and is enforceable.

The Code does not define the terms "modification" or "modify." Section

2-209(1) merely refers to "an agreement modifying a contract." 33 Agreement

is defined as "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by

implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of
trade or course of performance. . . .34 An agreement is the culmination of
the parties' negotiations and evidences their intent to contract, 35 but the parties' agreement is not a contract under the Code. A contract is "the total legal

obligation which results from the parties' agreement ....

,,36 Once the par-

ties have entered into an agreement, the Code determines whether and to what
extent that agreement is enforceable as a contract. The dictionary definition of
the term "modify" is "to change." 37 Official Comment 1 to section 2-209,

which refers to modifications as "adjustments," 3 8 suggests that the Code incor-

porates the dictionary definition of "modify." 39 Under the definitions of
agreement and contract in the Code and the dictionary definition of "modify,"

an "agreement that modifies a contract" is the bargain of the parties in fact to
change a legal obligation that results from the parties' original agreement. 40 A
29. See, e.g., Feyh v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 3 N.Y.2d 971, 146 N.E.2d 794, 169 N.Y.S.2d
38 (1957) (mem.). See also Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 9 (4th Cir. 1971)
(price subject to escalation dependent on production costs).
30. See I. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS-EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 890 (2d ed.
1978) (flexibility needs to be ensured as a means of effecting mutually agreeable changes).
31. For example, the parties may appoint a neutral party to complete gaps in their agreement. Macneil, supra note 10, at 866.
32. An offer of proof concerning the filling of a gap left inadvertently by contractual silence
also is not an attempt to modify a contract. For example, if a contract does not indicate the
quality of seed sold to a buyer, oral testimony may be offered to show the quality intended. See
Flamm v. Scherer, 40 Mich. App. 1, 198 N.W.2d 702 (1972). When the contract is silent on the
point, a buyer should not be precluded from demonstrating that the seller agreed to deliver "grade
A" seed on the ground that agreement to deliver "grade A" seed would be a contract modification.
33. See note 14 supra for the text of U.C.C. § 2-209(1).
34. U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
35. See, e.g. Kleinschmidt Div. of SCM Corp. v. Futuronics Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 972, 973, 363
N.E.2d 701, 702, 395 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (1977).
36. U.C.C. § 1-201(11).
37. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1452 (unabridged 3d ed. 1976).
38. U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 1.
39. See also In re Estate of Upchurch, 62 Tenn. App. 634, 644, 466 S.W.2d 886, 890 (1970).
40. See, e.g., Van Den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 576 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978).
The New York Revision Commission concluded that the language of section 2-209(l) was
apparently tautological because an agreement, defined as a "bargain in fact" under the Code,
suggests that consideration was given while the rest of the subsection states that the agreement to
modify "needs no consideration to be binding." I STUDY, supra note 2, at 642. The assumption is
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modification contract is the legal obligation that results from the modification
agreement. In Problem One Selco must attempt to persuade the court not that
a bargain of the parties was made to change the price term of the original
agreement, but instead that the original agreement, though vaguely worded,
contains the price escalation clause. Whether Selco is entitled to the price increase is, therefore, an issue of contract interpretation, not of contract modifi41
cation.
What is the legal significance for Selco and Buyco of a finding that Selco
is merely attempting to enforce the original agreement, not a modification of
the original agreement? Selco, in support of its action, must prove the existence and effect of the price escalation clause in the original agreement rather
than the existence and enforceability of a modification of the $10,000 price
term in the original agreement. Selco can avoid the strictures of section 2-209,
but instead must contend with the rules of contract interpretation under the
Code.42
PROBLEM TWO
Selco andBuyco enter into a written agreementforthe sale by Selco
to Buyco offive slushfreezers. The written agreement contains a price
provision of $10,000for thefivefreezers andnoprice escalationclause.
On the date of delivery Selco seeks an increase in the purchaseprice
based upon its theory that, in their trade,priceprovisions are projectionsonly andare subject to marketpricefluctuations.Buyco refuses to
negotiate aprice alteration. Selco refuses to deliver and brings an action againstBuyco. At trialSelco seeks to introduce evidence ofa trade
practice to support its assertion that the price term was subject to further agreement.
The basic approach of the Code to contract interpretation is to admit extrinsic evidence liberally to determine the meaning of the words used by the
parties in reaching an agreement. 43 As discussed in Problem One, "agreement" is defined in U.C.C. section 1-201(3) as "the bargain of the parties in
fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances
made in this Article that the language eliminating the need for consideration should prevail over
any implication that consideration is required arising from the use of the terms "bargain" and

"agreement."

41. But see Silver v. Sloop Silver Cloud, 259 F. Supp. 187, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (agreement
for sale of sloop included price provision of $27,750 "plus extras;" held that subsequent agreement
on extras was a modification of the contract).
42. If Selco were attempting to modify the price term the issues for litigation under U.C.C.
§ 2-209 would include whether an agreement to modify had been made, the good faith of Selco in
achieving the modification, whether the modification required a writing, whether Buyco had
waived the price provision or the writing requirement, and whether Buyco had retracted the
waiver. The difficulties in interpreting § 2-209 that can be avoided by a finding that Selco was
attempting only to enforce the original agreement are discussed in Part II of this Article. The
rules of contract interpretation are governed by U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-201, 2-202, and 2-208. See
also discussion of Problem Two infra.
43. See MURRAY ON CoNTRACTs 745 (2d rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as MURRAY]; R.
NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES 144-45 (1970).
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"
The "other circumstances" include course of dealing and usage of
trade. 45 In determining whether Selco was seeking to modify the written
agreement or simply to execute it, evidence of trade usage should be admissible to aid in interpretation of the terms of the original agreement. If Selco can
demonstrate that, in the trade, price terms in contracts for the sale of slush

....

freezers are projections only, the original agreement between the parties
should include that interpretation. The trade practice evidence would demon-

strate that Selco was attempting to enforce the original agreement, not at46
tempting to modify it.
In response to a claim by Selco that it was attempting to enforce the original agreement only, Buyco could assert that under Code section 1-205(4)

Selco's evidence of trade usage should be inadmissible. Under that section,
express terms of an agreement "control" inconsistent course of dealing and

usage of trade. 47 Buyco could argue that, since the price term was $10,000 and
the agreement did not indicate that the term was a projection only, the express
price provision should "control" Selco's evidence of trade usage. 48 If Buyco
prevailed on this argument, Selco would be in breach unless it could show that
a modification agreement to renegotiate the price had been formed.
44. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
45. U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
46. See, e.g., Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971) (trade
usage evidence that price and quantity terms are projections to be adjusted according to market
forces admissible). But see Southern Concrete Serv., Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F.
Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975), af'dper curiam, 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1978).
Similarly, if Selco and Buyco had dealt with each other in the past, and Buyco frequently had
accepted alterations of the price term of those agreements, then, in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary, the slush freezer agreement would contain the implication that Buyco would agree to
alterations of the price term. The course of dealing evidence would be presented to demonstrate
that Selco was seeking to enforce the original agreement, not to modify it.
The Code parol evidence rule, § 2-202, is consistent with the approach suggested in the text.
The section states that course of dealing and usage of trade may "explain or supplement" the final
written agreement. U.C.C. § 2-202(a).
47. U.C.C. 1-205(4) provides:
The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of dealing or usage of
trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when
such construction is unreasonable express terms control both course of dealing and usage
of trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade.
See, e.g., Beautis Products Co., Inc. v. Chromatic Corp., 24 U.C.C. REP. 35, 38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978). See generally Kirst, Usage ofTrade and Course of Dealng. Subversion of the UCC Theory,
1977 U. ILL. L.F. 811.
48. Section 1-205(4) also states that, when reasonable, express terms and trade usage or
course of dealing are to be construed as consistent with each other. Perhaps in Problem Two the
existence of the $10,000 price term is consistent with the interpretation that it is a projection only.
See, e.g., Modine Mfg. Co. v. North East Independent Sch. Dist., 503 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973). This approach to § 1-205(4) suffers from the inherent difficulties in attempting to resolve
whether extrinsic evidence is consistent or contradicts the writing. In Peoples Bank & Trust v.
Reiff, 256 N.W.2d 336 (N.D. 1977), for example, the court held that extrinsic evidence of an
agreement granting a secured creditor superiority as to "any claims in excess of $15,000" was
'inconsistent with the writing that stated that the amount of superiority would be determined under
Article 9 of the Code. .Id at 342. But in Modine Mfg. Co. v. North East Independent Sch. Dist.,
503 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), the court held that evidence of trade usage allowing variations in cooling capacity was consistent with a writing that specified a definite figure. Id at 843.
See also Southern Concrete Serv., Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga.
1975).
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The U.C.C. de-emphasizes the importance of written agreements so that
the actual bargain of the parties, determined after an examination of all surrounding circumstances, can be enforced. 49 If section 1-205(4) is interpreted
to bar any evidence of course of dealing and usage of trade that appears inconsistent with the express terms of an agreement, this general goal of the Code
will be impeded. 50 The section should be read narrowly to avoid such a result.

Course of dealing and trade usage evidence should be admissible except when
clear evidence beyond the dictionary meaning of the express language of the
agreement demonstrates that the parties intended to exclude it. In situations
like Problem Two, in which the trade usage appears inconsistent with the dictionary meaning of the language of the agreement, the trade usage evidence
still should be submitted to the trier of5fact to determine whether the evidence
is inconsistent with the parties' intent. '

The admonition in section 1-205(4) that express provisions "control" inconsistent course of dealing or usage of trade evidence should never bar the
admissibility of that evidence, even when it clearly is inconsistent with the
writing, if the parties have agreed after the original contract formation that the
course of dealing or usage of trade should supplement their agreement. In
this situation the parties have formed a modification agreement or have
waived the inconsistent written term.52 For example, in Problem Two if, at
the time of contracting, the parties did not intend that the price provision
would be subject to further agreement, but they subsequently agreed to follow
the trade practice of renegotiating the price provision, the evidence of the
trade practice would be offered to support the modified agreement or waiver
49. See Murray, The ParolEvidence ProcessandStandardizedAgreementsUnder the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1342, 1349 (1975). See also text accompanying
note 43 supra.
50. For example, in Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 136 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 288 (1979), the court stated that although "past conduct" may have
created a "reasonable expectation" that Amana would not terminate a distributorship agreement
arbitrarily, the contract gave Amana the right to terminate arbitrarily. By upholding the express
terms, the court subverted the express policy of the Code to construe evidence of course of dealing
and usage of trade "as an element of the meaning of the words used." U.C.C. § 2-202, Comment
2. See generally Kirst, supra note 47, at 844.
51. The trier of fact could determine the terms of the contract in exactly the same way that it
would if faced with a contract that contained express conflicting terms-by examining the language of the agreement and the overall circumstances to determine the intent of the parties. For
example, if trade usage evidence was contrary to the dictionary meaning of the language, but was
consistent with the basic nature of the transaction, the trade usage should supplement the written
language of the deal in the absence of additional evidence tending to show that the trade usage
meaning was not intended to be employed by the parties. If the trade usage evidence contradicted
the basic nature of the transaction, it could be excluded from the agreement by the trier of fact on
the ground that the parties did not intend to include it. See 1 STUDY, supra note 2, at 324-25.
Thus, in Problem Two if the writing and overall circumstances demonstrated that the parties
intended that the price provision was firm, and that they intended to gamble on market fluctuations, the trade usage would be inconsistent with the parties' transaction. Similarly, if the writing
contained a provision barring supplementation by evidence of course of dealing or usage of trade,
that provision would demonstrate the intent of the parties to exclude the inconsistent course of
dealing or trade usage from the agreement. See Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451
F.2d 3, 10 (4th Cir. 1971). In the absence of such evidence of an intent to exclude course of
dealing and usage of trade evidence, § 1-205(4) should not be interpreted to bar such evidence
simply because it appears inconsistent with the writing.
52. See generally text accompanying notes 110-228 infra.
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and should not be barred by section 1-205(4). Of course, the evidence must
53
meet the admissibility standards applicable to modifications or waivers.
PROBLEM THREE
On February1, Selco andBuyco enter into negotiationsfor the sale
to Buyco offive slush freezers. An oral.agreementis reached on that
dateforBuyco to purchasefivefreezersfora totalpriceof $10,000 with
delivery to be on March L A written contract is signedby both parties
on February 10. The written contractprovidesfor a delivery date of
March 15. Buyco refuses to accept thefreezers on March 15 claiming
breach by Selcoforfailure to deliver on March 1.
Because a modification agreement is an agreement that alters a prior contract, and a contract is the total legal obligation resulting from the parties'
agreement,54 if the prior agreement is unenforceable so that no legal obligation arises, it may be proper to treat the agreement that supersedes the unenforceable agreement not as a modification, but as the only agreement in
existence. Thus in Problem Three, Selco could argue that the oral agreement
made on February 1 was unenforceable under the Code statute of frauds.55
Accordingly, the only agreement that would govern the dispute would be the
written agreement of February 10, which includes the March 15 delivery date.
That agreement would not be a modification agreement, and an analysis of
section 2-209 to determine its enforceability would not be required.
Even if a court accepted this approach, Selco would not necessarily prevail. Buyco could seek reformation of the written contract to reflect the original delivery date. The reformation remedy, apparently available under Code
section 1-103,56 would require a showing that the written contract does not
reflect the actual agreement made between the parties because of a mistake in
drafting or fraud. 57 The Code statute of frauds or parol evidence rule, 58 however, might bar the admissibility of evidence of the previous oral agreement on
the theory that a written executory contract should not be reformed to reflect
an unenforceable oral agreement. Nevertheless, courts should be able to avoid
the strictures of those rules in order to give effect to the intent of the parties
See text accompanying notes 140-53, 170-203 infra. See also discussion of U.C.C.
at text accompanying notes 204-215 infra.
See text accompanying note 36 supra.
Section 2-201(1) of the Code provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the
price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent
or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term
agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quanti-

53.
§ 2-208
54.
55.

ty of goods shown in such writing.
56. The equitable remedy of reformation seeks to make the writing of the parties reflect the
parties' true intentions. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 256 (1973). Reformation is available under the Code to the extent that it is not "specifically displaced." See U.C.C.
§ 1-103, note 183 infra. See generally Hillman, supra note 4.
57. See D. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 256.

58. See U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 2-202.
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59
and to enforce the actual agreement made between the parties.
The written agreement of February 10 could be treated as a modification
agreement if the statute of frauds is viewed as merely providing an affirmative
defense to an existing enforceable obligation. Instead of wrestling with the
issues of reformation, statute of frauds, and parol evidence, the court then
would be required to determine whether the parties intended in good faith to
alter their agreement as to the delivery date. 60 Thus, whether or not the written agreement is treated as a modification agreement, the basic issue in Problem Three is the date of delivery agreed on by the parties. Nevertheless, the
litigation will be significantly different, depending on whether the dispute is
cast as one involving interpretation of the writing of February 10, or one involving determination of its enforceability as a modification.

B. Mod'flcation Formation v. Agreement Formation
Contracting parties often do not reach agreement at one meeting or after
the exchange of one set of writings. Rather, a series of meetings and communications culminates in agreement, although it is often difficult to determine at
what point agreement is actually reached. 61 The Code sections dealing with
contract formation respond to this commercial reality by eliminating many of
the formalities of common-law contract formation. 62 For example, section 2207(1) abandons the so-called "mirror image" rule, thereby allowing agreement formation even though an acceptance contains additional or different
terms. 63 Under section 2-204(1), agreements can be formed by the parties'
conduct as well as by verbal or written communications when evidence of intent to contract exists.64 Section 2-204(2) directs that the exact moment of the
contract's formation need not be isolated. 65 By broadening the rules of contract formation, the Code has blurred the distinction between contract formation and modification formation. 6 6 As a result, whether a contested term is
part of the original contract or an attempted modification of the contract is
sometimes difficult to determine. Resolution of the issue affects the approach
of the court and the litigants and can affect the outcome of the dispute.
59. See D. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 643-44, 749-52.

60. See U.C.C. §§ 2-209(1) & Comment 1; 1-203; text accompanying notes 111-126 infra.
61. This observation is evidenced by the large number of cases that have wrestled with the
issue of when a contract was formed. See, e.g., Mississippi & Dominion Steamship Co. v. Swift,
86 Me. 248, 29 A. 1063 (1894).
62. See generally J. WHiTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 40-42.

63. Under the common-law "mirror image" rule, an acceptance must contain no new provisions and must agree to all terms of the offer to be operative. Section 2-207(1), however, states
that an expression of acceptance "operates" as an acceptance "even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon.. . ." See note 79 infra.
64. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) provides: "A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of
such a contract."
65. U.C.C. § 2-204(2) provides: "An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale
may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined."
66. See text accompanying notes 75-76, 90-92 infra.
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PROBLEM FOUR
Buyco sends a letter to Selco on the same day that thepartiessign a
written contractfor the sale by Selco to Buyco of five slush freezers.
The letter states that Buyco has the option to resell the equpment to
Selco one year after delivery. The sales contract A silent on thepoint.
At the end of the year Buyco wishes to resell the equipment to Selco.
Selco refuses to repurchasethe equipment andclaims that the letter was
a mod$cation
of the original contract that was never accepted by
Selco. 67

To determine whether Buyco's resale option in Problem Four is enforceable, a court must decide whether the option was part of the original agreement
between the parties or, if not, whether the option was an enforceable modification of the original agreement. Under the general formation provision of section 2-204(1) of the Code, the option is part of the original agreement if the
parties orally agreed that the option would be included in the agreement and
intended that Buyco's letter would confirm that agreement. If the parties did
not reach an oral agreement on the resale option prior to Buyco's letter, the
option would not become part of the original agreement under section 2204(1).68 Nevertheless, the court still would need to determine whether the
resale option in Buyco's letter was enforceable as a modification agreement.
The principal issue in the modification inquiry would be whether Selco agreed
to change the already existing agreement for the sale of the freezers to include
69
the option.
If the resale option is part of the original agreement, Selco can raise the
defense of the section 2-201 statute of frauds and argue that it never signed the
writing providing for the option. 70 Secton 2-201, however, does not require
that every written communication between the parties be signed. Instead, it
requires that there be "some writing" sufficient to prove that a contract has
been made by the parties. Perhaps if Buyco can demonstrate that the parties
intended for the letter to be part of "the contract," which is evidenced by the
separate signed writing, Selco's statute of frauds argument should fail. If the
resale option is part of the original agreement, Buyco also can assert that its
letter was a confirmation of the contract that satisfies the section 2-201(2) exception to the statute of frauds requirement or that performance of the con67. Problem Four is loosely based upon the facts of In re Estate of Upchurch, 62 Tenn. App.
634, 466 S.W.2d 886 (1970).

68. If Buyco's letter was a confirmation "operating as an acceptance" under U.C.C. § 2207(1), the option to resell would not become part of the contract because it is a material term
under U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b). See notes 79-80 infra. The letter probably was not such a confirmation and § 2-207 probably should not apply because the letter simply tried to introduce a new
term, the resale option, and did not confirm other aspects of the deal.
69. In Cambern v. Hubbling, 307 Minn. 168, 238 N.W.2d 622 (1976), the court held that
buyers, to whom calves were delivered, never assented to a clause in a receipt that excluded
seller's liability for sickness or death of the calves. In the absence of actual agreement to accept
the clause as part of the original agreement, or as a modification of the agreement, the clause is, of
course, unenforceable.
70. See U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (set forth at note 55 supra).
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71
tract makes the letter admissible under section 2-201(3)(c).
If the litigation between the parties centers on whether an enforceable
modification agreement has been formed, different issues will be involved.
Under section 2-209(1) no consideration by Buyco for the resale option would
be required. The litigation, however, may focus upon the good faith of Buyco
in achieving the modification.7 2 Section 2-209(3), which requires compliance
with Article 2's statute of frauds for modifications "within" its provisions, may
require that Selco sign the modification, 73 although section 2-209(4), which
recognizes waivers, may enable Buyco to argue that no signing was required.
receipt of Buyco's letter may constitute a waiver of the
Selco's silence after
74
frauds.
of
statute
Because different issues arise if the question of the enforceability of the
resale option is treated as one of modification formation rather than agreement formation, the question must be categorized properly. Thus, although
the Code de-emphasizes the need for finding the precise moment when an
agreement is formed, 75 in Problem Four a court must determine whether the
parties reached an agreement on the sale of the slush freezers without the resale option, or whether the option was intended to be part of the agreement
the moment when the original bargain
between the parties. In other words,
76
has been struck must be isolated.

PROBLEM FIVE
Selco andBuyco enter into negotiationsforthe sale to Buyco offive
slushfreezers. Shortly before Selco's delivery, Buyco sends Selco a telegram that states: "Enterour order "039" andproceed immediately
with procurement. Confirmation willfollow shortly." The telegram is
followed immediately by a letter of similar tenor.- "Our "039" will be
issuedshortly to cover our requirements,and'you are to proceed immediately with procurement of all materials." Selco ultimately receives
document "039" (still before the time for delivery), which is entitled
"Confirmation." The Confirmation contains the following notation:
"In order to become a valid and binding agreement between us, order
71. See note 131 infra for a discussion of§ 2-201(2). Section 2-201(3)(c) states that an agreement is enforceable "with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or
" Comment 2 to § 2-201 states that "[t]he overt
which have been received and accepted ....
actions of the parties make admissible evidence of the other terms of the contract necessary to a

just apportionment."
72. See text accompanying notes 111-126 infra; see also Morgan Brothers v. Haskell Corp.,
24 Wash. App. 773, 604 P.2d 1295 (1979). If the letter is part of the original contract, good faith
still could be an issue under U.C.C. § 1-203. Because the Code substitutes the issue of good faith

for the requirement of consideration in contract modification, however, see U.C.C. § 2-209(1) &
Comment I, good faith is more likely to be litigated in the context of contract modification.
73. See text accompanying notes 140-153 infra.
74. See text accompanying notes 188-193 infra.
75. U.C.C. § 2-204(2).
76. See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 43, at 119-20. On facts similar to Problem Four, the
court in In re Estate of Upchurch, 62 Tenn. App. 634, 466 S.W.2d 886 (1970), held that the letter
was either part of the original contract or a modification thereof. Id at 644-45, 466 S.W.2d at 89091.
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must be accepted byyou. " Included on the reverse side of "039" is an
arbitrationprovision. Selco signs "039" andreturnsit to Buyco. Upon
delivery of the goods Buyco refuses to pay and claims defects in the
freezers. When litigation ensues Buyco seeks77a stay of courtproceedings on the basis of the arbitrationprovision.
The basic issue between the parties concerns the legal effect of the arbitra-

tion provision contained in document "039." At least three separate interpretations are plausible under the Code. First, since document "039" includes a

provision requiring a signed acceptance by Selco, and the document was
signed and accepted, arguably the parties' intent was that "039" was "the con-

tract" and that the arbitration provision would be part of that contract. 78 Such
a finding would make it unnecessary to consider whether the "039" arbitration

clause modified a previous agreement that did not include the arbitration provision.
Second, in view of the heading of "039" ("Confirmation"), it could be

argued that "039" was a written confirmation that operated as an acceptance
under U.C.C. section 2-207(1). 79 Under this interpretation the additional term

in the confirmation, the arbitration provision, ordinarily would not become
part of the contract under section 2-207(2)(b) because it is material.8 0 Accord-

ing to Comment 3 to section 2-207, however, if the arbitration term was "expressly agreed to" by Selco it would be enforceable. 8 '

Presumably the

Comment contemplates that inclusion of the additional term in the confirmation and express agreement to the term by the recipient of the confirmation

constitute a modification of the agreement. If so, the standard for proving a
modification under section 2-207 appears to be more stringent than under sec-

tion 2-209. Under section 2-207 the modification must be "expressly agreed
to" while no such requirement is found under sections 2-209 and 2-204(1).82

Because Selco signed and returned the confirmation to Buyco, the arbitration provision probably was "expressly agreed to" by Selco, and an enforcea77. Problem Five is loosely based on the facts of Southeastern Enameling Corp. v. General
Bronze Corp., 434 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1970).
78. The intent of the parties determines when an agreement has been made. See, e.g., United
States Indus., Inc. v. Semco Mfg., Inc., 562 F.2d 1061, 1067 (8th Cir. 1977); U.C.C. § 2-204(1).
The issue stated in the text is similar to the common-law issue of whether a writing was merely a
memorial of a prior enforceable oral contract, or whether the parties intended to have no enforceable contract until a writing was signed. See, e.g., Mississippi & Dominion Steamship Co. v.
Swift, 86 Me. 248, 29 A. 1063 (1894).
79. U.C.C. § 2-207(l) provides:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is
sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
80. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) provides: "The additional terms are to be construed as proposals
for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(b) they materially alter it."
81. See also Southeastern Enameling Corp. v. General Bronze Corp., 434 F.2d 330, 333 (5th
Cir. 1970).
82. Because an enforceable modification agreement is a contract, see text accompanying
notes 33-41 supra, the general contract formation provisions of §§ 2-204 through 2-207 apply
equally to modification formation. See text accompanying notes 93-94 infra.
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ble modification of the original agreement probably was formed. Selco could
argue, however, that in light of the stringent "expressly agreed to" standard of
section 2-207, the general dilution of the "duty to read" requirement in contract law,8 3 and the apparent purpose of section 2-207(2)(b) to avoid enforcement of material provisions foisted on unsuspecting parties, the arbitration
provision should not constitute an enforceable modification simply because
Selco signed the confirmation and failed to contest the existence of the arbitration provision. Section 2-207 was drafted in light of the commercial practice
of ignoring form contracts-perhaps even signed ones. 84 Selco could assert
that its signature on the confirmation is not reliable evidence that it "expressly
agreed to" the arbitration term. Of course, even under this reasoning, if additional negotiations took place after the signing of "039" that clearly demonstrated the parties' intent to add the arbitration provision, the provision then
could be enforced as a modification. 85
A third interpretation of Problem Five is that, assuming that the parties
already had formed a contract prior to document "039," the document should
be treated neither as an "expression of acceptance" nor as a confirmation that
"operates" as an acceptance under section 2-207(l):86 Section 2-207 would not
apply, but again the modification issue would arise. Under sections 2-209 and
2-204(1), Selco's failure to contest the arbitration provision and its signature
on document "039" probably would be sufficient to prove that Selco agreed to
the modification. Although sections 2-209 and 2-204(1) do not require that a
modification be "expressly agreed to," Selco still could assert that in light of
the commercial practice to ignore form contracts, document "039" should not
be treated as a modification in the absence of additional evidence of intent to
modify.
Section 2-207 of the Code has not been well received by courts or commentators.8 7 Most of the criticism has focused upon the difficulties in applying section 2-207 to contract formation disputes, and has not considered the
relationship of section 2-207 to modification issues. 88 Nevertheless, both contract formation and modification formation under section 2-207 must be analyzed to determine the legal effect of the arbitration provision in Problem Five.
83. For example, in insurance contracts the "objectively reasonable expectations" of an insured will be enforced even if the policy has negated those expectations. See, e.g., Rodman v.

State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Iowa 1973). Of course, a merchant may not be
excused as readily from the duty to read as a consumer.
84. See, e.g., J. WHrIm & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 24.
85. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) also would support a finding that the parties' overall conduct demonstrated that they had agreed to include the arbitration provision.
86. See, e.g., Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co., Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 445 F. Supp. 507 (D. Me. 1977).
But see U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment I (document would be a confirmation).
Still
another interpretation of the facts of Problem Five is plausible. Perhaps Confirmation

"039" is a counter-offer under § 2-207(l) on the theory that "039" required acceptance ofits terms.
Presumably, the counter-offer was accepted when Selco signed and returned the form.
87. See, eg., J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 38-39.
88. See generall, id at 24-39.
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PROBLEM SIX
On February15, Selco andBuyco enter into a signed written agreementfor the sale to Buyco offive slush freezers. After the agreement
has been signed, Selco's sales representative congratulatesBuyco's officer and comments that the slushfreezers Selco will deliver to Buyco
should be 'freefrom any defectsfor at leastfive years." The written
agreementis silent on thepoint. After delivery Buyco is dissatisfiedwith
thepelformance of the slushfreezersandbrings an action againstSelco
for breach of warranty. One of Buyco's claims is that Selco breached
an express warrantythat thefreezers would befreefrom defectsforfive
years.
Under section 2-313(1)(a) of the Code, express warranties may be added
to an agreement if they are part of the "basis of the bargain."8 9 Assuming that
an utterance cannot become part of the "basis of the bargain" after the deal
has been closed, 90 the time of contracting--the point in time when a contract
has been formed-is important under section 2-313. A post-contract affirmation may be enforceable as a modification of the agreement according to Comment 7 to section 2-313, but the rules of section 2-209 would apply to
determine its enforceability.
If the comments of Selco's sales representative in Problem Six had been
made before the deal was closed and an express warranty under section 2313(l)(a) had been formed, the warranty would survive attack under any of
the provisions of section 2-209 of the Code because the warranty would not be
a modification of the sales contract. For example, even if the written agreement barred oral modification, section 2-209(2), which enforces provisions
barring oral modification in certain circumstances, 9 ' would not apply to bar
the warranty. In the problem, however, section 2-209 would control the enforceability of the affirmation because the sales representative's comments
were made after the deal had been closed. If the written agreement barred
oral modification, the affirmation would be unenforceable under section 2209(2).92
89. U.C.C. § 2-313(l)(a) provides:
Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
The "basis of the bargain" language is far from clear. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note
11, at 332-37. See also Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1974); Jones v. Abriani, 350
N.E.2d 635 (Ind. App. 1976).
90. Comment 7 to § 2-313 states that the "sole question [as to whether an affirmation becomes part of the contract] is whether the language [is] fairly to be regarded as part of the contract.
If language is used after the closing of the deal.. . the warranty becomes a modification ...
White and Summers argue that warranties can arise under § 2-313(a) even after a consumer has
"handed over the money." See J. WIrTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 336-39.
91. See notes 127-139 and accompanying text ifra.
92. The warranty still might be enforceable as a waiver under § 2-209(4). See notes 170-203
and accompanying text infra for a discussion of that section. Even if the written agreement did
not bar oral modification, Buyco would have to show that the sales representative's affirmation
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Modcation Formation v. Minimization of Damages

Because an enforceable modification agreement is a contract, 93 the
U.C.C. rules of contract formation apply equally to modification formation.
The general goal of the rules of contract formation, and hence modification
formation, is to avoid the needless formalities of contract formation under previous law so that agreements can be enforced when the parties have intended
to contract. 94 One thorny problem of modification formation is determining
whethera contracting party who continued with performance after a contract
alteration intended to enter a modification agreement or continued performance merely to minimize loss. The Code has included section 1-207 and 2607(3)(a) to deal with the problem, but the sections may have increased the
confusion rather than diminished it.
PROBLEM SEVEN
On February15, Selco andBuyco enter into a written agreementfor
the sale to Buyco offive slushfreezersto be deliveredon March 15. On
February20, Selco notfles Buyco in writing that it cannot deliver the
freezers untilApril15 because of delays in the receot of raw materials
from its suppliers. Buyco responds on February21 in writingthat it will
accept thefreezers on April 15, but that the delay in delivery will cause
Buyco substantiallosses because it will result in a slowdown of itsproduction of ice cream. Buyco accepts thefreezers on April 15 andpays
the contractpriceon that datefor them. On August 1, Buyco brings an
action against Selcofor lost profits due to the delay in delivery.

Two issues of modification formation are represented by the facts of
Problem Seven. First, what is the legal significance of Buyco's February 21
agreement to accept the freezers on April 15? Second, what is the legal significance of Buyco's actual acceptance of the freezers on April 15? On the first
issue, Buyco may assert that its agreement to accept late delivery constituted
an effort to minimize loss, and that the letter of Feburary 21 evidenced
Buyco's intent to reserve its right to seek damages for Selco's delay. In response, Selco can claim that Buyco's agreement to accept late delivery constituted an agreement to change the date of delivery, not an attempt to minimize
loss upon breach.
At common law, whether Buyco accepted a modification of the delivery
date in its February 21 letter or merely notified Selco that it would take the
late freezers to avoid loss while reserving its rights to seek damages for the
delay, depended on whether the parties entered into an accord and satisfaction. An accord is a "substitutfe]. . . performance differing from that originally due; ' 9 5 "satisfaction," which has the legal effect of barring recourse for
constituted an agreement to modify under § 2-209(1) or an attempt at modification under § 2209(4). See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 338.
93. See text accompanying notes 35-40 supra.
94. See notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
95. L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BAsic CONTRACT LAW 220 (3d ed. 1972).
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the breach of the original contract, occurs either when the substitute contract is
96
If
made, or when it is performed, depending on the intent of the parties.
Buyco and Selco entered into an accord and satisfaction, Buyco would be
barred from seeking damages for the late delivery. Whether Buyco and Selco
entered into an accord and satisfaction would be determined by the intent of
the parties. 97 Many common-law cases entertained the presumption that acceptance of an offer to alter a contract formed an accord or an accord and
satisfaction and was not merely an effort to minimize loss.98 According to
these cases, therefore, Buyco would have the burden of persuading the trier of
fact that in agreeing to accept the goods on April 15 it only attempted to minimize loss.
The effect of the U.C.C. on these common-law rules is unclear. Section 1207 requires an "explicit" reservation of rights to preserve any rights whenever
a party assents to a substitute performance offered by the other party.9 9
Therefore, the Code may require a finding in favor of Selco in Problem Seven.
Buyco was not explicit in reserving rights; it merely noted that it would incur
losses due to the delay. Comment 2 to section 1-207, however, may aid Buyco.
By referring to the section as one "method of procedure" to preserve rights,
Comment 2 suggests that rights might be reserved by other methods. 100 Presumably section 1-207 does not require the use of qualifying words such as
"without prejudice," but rather it indicates only that these words are sufficient
to satisfy the common-law burden of persuasion that an accord and satisfaction was not intended.' 0 ' This interpretation of section 1-207 is consistent
96. Id at 222. See also Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After MaterialBreach--Common
Law Mitigation Rules, the U.C.C., andthe Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv.
553, 565 & n.51 (1976); Problem 16 infra.
97. See, e.g., N.B. Borden & Co. v. Vinegar Bend Lumber Co., 7 Ala. App. 335, 62 So. 245
(1913); Harrison v. Henderson, 67 Kan. 194, 72 P. 875 (1903).
98. See, e.g., United States ex rel Int'l Contracting Co. v. Lamont, 155 U.S. 303 (1894);
United States v. Brookridge Farm, Inc., 111 F.2d 461, 464-65 (10th Cir. 1940); Hillman, supra note
96, at 570.
99. Section 1-207 of the Code provides: "A party who with explicit reservation of rights
performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by
the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as 'without prejudice,'
'under protest' or the like are sufficient." The purpose of § 1-207 is discussed in Hawkland, The
Effect of U C.C Section 1-207 on the DoctrineofAccord and Satisfactionby ConditionalCheck, 74
COM. L.J. 329, 331 (1969); McDonnell, PurposiveInterpretationof the Uniform CommercialCode:
Some Implicationsfor Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 825-28 (1978). Most cases construing the section have involved payment of a debt with a check that the payee has indorsed with
protest. In Shea-Kaiser-Lockheed-Healy v. Department of Water, 73 Cal. App. 3d 679, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 884 (1977), however, the court applied the section when a seller delivered goods with explicit
reservation of rights after buyer's breach. See also Cities Serv. Helex Inc. v. United States, 543
F.2d 1306 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
100. "This section does not add any new requirement of language of reservation where not
already required by law, but merely provides a specific measure on which a party can rely as he
makes or concurs in any interim adjustment in the course of performance." U.C.C. § 1-207, Comment 2.
101. In Jon-T Farms, Inc. v. Goodpasture, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 743 (Trex. Civ. App. 1977), the
buyer accepted six late shipments of grain sorghum after seller repudiated the contract. Seller
contended that buyer waived the right to assert the breach because buyer failed to reserve its rights
under § 1-207. The court held that buyer had not waived its rights, even though it had failed to
reserve them explicitly, because buyer had refused to honor seller's drafts and had demanded that
seller honor the contract. The court stated that "[tihe statute is permissive rather than
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with the basic approach of the Code to avoid the formalities of contract formation. When it is clear that a reasonable contracting party would know that the
other party was not agreeing to a modification, but was merely attempting to
minimize loss, the injured party should not be penalized by a failure to preserve rights "explicitly." Nevertheless, perhaps section 1-207 suggests that in
explicit, the party claiming
any case in which the reservation of rights is not 102
such a reservation should be required to prove it.
On the second issue in Problem Seven-the legal significance of Buyco's
acceptance of the freezers on April 15-Selco can argue that Buyco's acceptance of the goods was a waiver of the time for performance provision. A
waiver might be found under section 2-209(4), which provides that "an attempt at modification

. . .

can operate as a waiver;" 10 3 under section 1-103,

outlet; 1°4

or under section 2-607(3)(a), which provides that
the common-law
of breach or be barred from any remedy. 0 5
the
seller
the buyer must notify
A claim of waiver by acceptance under section 2-209(4) or section 1-103
raises issues similar to those involving whether the parties made an accord and
satisfaction. If Buyco's letter to Selco on February 21 was reasonable notice
that Buyco would take the goods only to minimize loss, acceptance of the
goods should not constitute a section 2-209(4) or common-law waiver of
Buyco's right to seek damages for the delay. 10 6 The success of a claim that
Buyco is barred under section 2-607(3)(a) from any remedy because it accepted the goods depends on whether Buyco's letter of February 21 constituted
reasonable notice of breach. Presumably, if Buyco's letter of February 21 was
reasonable notice that it would take the goods only to minimize loss, it also
2-607(3)(a),
should suffice as reasonable notice of breach under t0section
7
thereby permitting Buyco to seek damages for the delay.
Suppose Buyco had accepted the freezers on April 15 without having sent
its letter on February 21 "reserving rights." Would notification of the breach
sent to Selco after acceptance preserve Buyco's right to seek damages for the
delay? Selco could assert that the section 1-207 requirement of explicit reservation displaces section 2-607(3)(a) when the aggrieved party receives advance
notice of the anticipated delay. Comment 2 to section 1-207, however, rebuts
mandatory." Id at 747. See also Barbarossa & Sons, Inc. v. Iten Chevrolet, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 655,
661-62 (Minn. 1978) (oral "protest" of notice of late delivery sufficient to preserve rights); U.C.C.
§ 1-207, Comment 2 ("[This section] does [not] disturb the policy of those cases which restrict the

effect of a waiver of a defect to reasonable limits under the circumstances, even though no such

reservation is expressed.").
102. See Problem Twelve infra for a discussion of whether the statute of frauds of § 1-107
protects Buyco from being bound to an oral modification of the delivery date in situations in
which Buyco fails to reserve rights explicitly.
103. See text accompanying notes 170-203 infra.
104. See note 183 and accompanying text infra.

105. Section 2-607(3)(a) states that: "Where a tender has been accepted.
within a reasonable time.

. .

. .

the buyer must

notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy."

106. No "attempt at modification" under § 2-209(4) or intentional relinquishment of a right

under § 1-103 would have occurred. See notes 170-203 and accompanying text infra.

107. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 975-76 (5th Cir.
1976).
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that argument.' 0 8 In the alternative, Selco could argue that a reasonable time
for notification under section 2-607(3)(a) expired on delivery of the goods. 0 9
II.

ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACT MODIFICATIONS
UNDER THE U.C.C.

Once it has been determined that the parties have entered into a modification agreement, the next task is to determine whether the modification agreement is an enforceable contract. Section 2-209 of the Code governs many of
the issues of modification enforceability. The section contains both broad
principles and specific rules, but, primarily because of infelicitous drafting, the
section is not very successful in balancing the need for flexibility with the need
for certainty. Attention must be focused on the basic goal of the section-"to
protect and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications. . . without regard to the technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments" 1 - so that the section will be interpreted in a way that facilitates
enforcement of freely made modifications and polices effectively against coerced or fraudulent modifications.
A.

Good Faith in Achieving the Modfication l"

PROBLEM EIGHT
On February 15, Selco and Buyco enter into a written agreement
for the sale to Buyco offive slushfreezers to be deliveredon March 15
for $2,000perfreezer. On March 1, Selco notifies Buyco that it will
deliver on March 15 only !fBuyco agrees in writing to pay $2,200for
eachfreezer. Buyco needs thefreezers and cannot get them elsewhere.
Therefore, it agreesin writingtopay $2,200, but on delivery it refuses to
pay any more than $2,000perfreezer. Selco brings an action to enforce
Buyco's agreement to pay $2,200perfreezer.Buyco defends by claiming that it agreedto theprice increaseunder duress andthat Selco violated its obligation of goodfaithperformance.
At common law Buyco's promise to pay $2,200 for each freezer was unenforceable under the preexisting duty rule.1 2 Because Selco had the preexisting duty of delivering the freezers for $2,000 each, Buyco's promise to pay
more lacked new consideration by Selco to support it. Although an impediment to freely made changes in contract terms, the preexisting duty rule
helped deter change brought about by the economic coercion of one party.
Little incentive existed to coerce a modification that would be unenforceable
108. Comment 2 to § 1-207 states that the section "does not affect or impair" § 2-607(3)(a).
109. The New York Law Revision Commission concluded that the Code was unclear on this
question. See 1 STUDY, supra note 2, at 331-32.
110. U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 1. The Comments are sources of the Code's purposes and
policies. See Hillman, supra note 4, at 681 & n.165.
111. This subject is treated extensively in Hillman, supra note 15.
112. See, e.g., 2 WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 12-2, at 3; Hillman, Contract ModjAcation in
Iowa-Recker v. Gustafson and the Resurrection of the Preexisting Duty Doctrine, 65 IowA L.
REv. 343, 345-46 (1980).
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under the rule." 3 Section 2-209(1) of the Code rejects the preexisting duty
rule." r4 The Code approach to policing against coercion in the formation of
modifications is the obligation of good faith performance-only modifications
made in good faith are enforceable. 115 Presumably those modifications made
as a result of economic coercion are not made in good faith.
The Code approach leaves unanswered many issues relevant to the outcome of Problem Eight. The Code does not determine who should bear the
burden of proving that a modification was or was not in good faith. The Code
also is silent on factors that are relevant to the determination of good or bad
faith in achieving modifications. Does Buyco's lack of market alternatives require a finding of Selco's bad faith? Is coercion by Selco equivalent to bad
faith? Should the availability ofjudicial remedies to Buyco preclude a finding
of coercion? What factors, if any, should permit Selco to hold out for more
16

money? 1

Modification cases dealing with the good faith issue have not answered
these questions adequately, and they sometimes have reached curious resuits.' 1 7 This suggests that the Code's heavy reliance on the broad standard of
good faith is not successful in the modification context. Further guidance may
be required to enable contracting parties to determine the amount of pressure
each party may fairly place on the other in attempting to achieve a modification. 118

The common-law economic duress rules could provide guidance in
resolving disputes such as Problem Eight. These rules could be employed directly as a supplement to the Code under section 1-103, or indirectly as a
method of determining good faith. Under an economic duress approach, if the
party opposing the modification had no legitimate alternative to accepting the
modification, and if the means employed for achieving the modification were
unlawful (for example, threats were made), then the promise made by the
113. Hillman, supra note 15, at 855. The preexisting duty rule was sometimes circumvented
by the creation of sham additional consideration. See id at 853.
114. See text accompanying note 14 supra. See generally Hillman, supra note 15.
115. U.C.C. § 1-203. See Hillman, supra note 15, at 856-62. The rules of economic duress,
which supplement the Code under § 1-103, also are available to police contract modification. Id
at 900. See note 183 infra.
116. These and other questions are addressed in Hillman, supra note 15.
117. See id at 862-76.
118. An approach is suggested in id at 880-901. Good faith and unconscionability have been
referred to as "standards" that function as "residual categories" essential to the proper functioning
of any legal system. The purpose of these "standards" is to enable the legal system to change

while ensuring stability through continuity. See Ellinghaus, supra note 4, at 759-60. I am not

suggesting that "standards" such as good faith should not have been included in the Code, only
that for contract modification other approaches to policing against coerced modifications may
have been superior. See also Hillman, supra note 15, at 878-79. As Professor Ellinghaus has
stated, draftsmen can be criticized for choosing "to fling into the fray a 'residual category' at a
time when. . . it has not yet become clear that the disparate phenomena intended to be embraced

by that category are in fact usefully subsumable in such a way." Ellinghaus, supra note 4, at 760.

The New York Law Revision Commission, studying the Code prior to its enactment, suggested that "good faith" would not be successful in the context of § 2-209. 1 STUDY, supra note 2,

Doc. No. 65(c), at 641.
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party claiming duress is unenforceable.' 19 In Problem Eight, because Buyco
forfeited substantial rights by agreeing to the price increase, and because reasonable persons do not often give up substantial rights for nothing in return,
perhaps Selco should have the burden of demonstrating the absence of duress.' 20 Selco could shift the burden back to Buyco by showing that it was
reasonable for Buyco to sacrifice substantial rights in the context of Problem
Eight. 12 1 To prevail in the litigation, Selco also could attempt to demonstrate
that Buyco had other choices, or that Selco's means in achieving the modifica122
tion were proper.
PROBLEM NINE
On February15, Selco andBuyco enter into a written agreementfor
the sale offive slushfreezers to Buyco. The writingprovidesfora delivery date of March 15. On March 1, Selco noties Buyco that it can
deliver only one slush freezer because of a shortage of raw materials
createdby a shutdown ofmajorsupply sources. Buyco needs any quantity offreezers that can be supplied and cannot get them elsewhere.
Buyco agreesin writing to take one slushfreezerfrom Selco on March
15 in "Xullsatisfaction." Buyco later bringsan actionforbreach of the
February15 contract andclaims that its agreement to take onefreezer
was made under duress.
Because Buyco has no alternative source of supply, the principal issue in
determining whether Buyco was under duress in agreeing to the modification
concerns Selco's conduct.' 23 If the shortage of raw materials was not severe or
if the shutdown of supply was foreseeable, Selco should not be permitted to
extract concessions by threatening not to deliver or by being unable to deliver
because of its own negligence. If, on the other hand, the shortage of raw
materials was severe and the shutdown of supply was unforeseeable on February 15, the February 15 agreement might be commercially impracticable
under section 2-615 of the Code. 124 If Selco's performance was commercially
119. See Hillman, supra note 15, at 880-84. The questions of what constitutes a reasonable
alternative and what means are lawful in achievinmg a modification are discussed in id at 890-98.
See also Erie County Water Auth. v. Hen-Gar Constr. Corp., 27 U.C.C. REP. 49 (W.D.N.Y.
1979).
120. See Hillman,supra note 15, at 883-88 for a more complete analysis of the assignment of
burden of proof.
121. Selco could attempt to show that it was reasonable for Buyco to agree to pay more, for
example, to keep Selco as a supplier in the future. See id at 889-90.
122. See id at 890-98.
123. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
124. U.C.C. § 2-615(a) provides:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the
preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies
with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale
if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a
contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign
or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to

be invalid.
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impracticable, Selco would be released from the duty of performing the February 15 contract. Accordingly, no inference that the agreement of March I
resulted from a wrongful threat of nonperformance of the original contract
could arise.125 Selco would have had the right not to perform the February 15
contract, and a notification to Buyco of the refusal to perform would not be
wrongful.
Any, contract doctrine that renders the original agreement unenforceable
should have the same effect. For example, if Selco had been excused from
performance of the slush freezer contract on the grounds of mistake, refusing
to perform would not be improper and, upon reaching a new agreement, no
inference that the second agreement was procured in bad faith should arise. 126
B. Statute of Frauds
PROBLEM TEN
A "contractof sale"preparedby Selco andsent to Joseph Buyer, a
consumer, sets forth an agreementfor Buyer to purchasefive slush

freezersfor $2,000 perfreezer. A clause of the writing provides that
"thepartiescan modify this agreement only by a signed written agreement. " Buyer signs the contractof sale but does not separatelysign the
provision barringoralmodification. Priorto delivery Buyer orally negotiates with Selcofor a reduction of the purchaseprice. The parties

orally agree on the price of $1,800perfreezer. Selco later refuses to
deliverfor less than $2,000perfreezer.
Section 2-209(2)127 of the Code enables parties to bar oral modification of
their written agreement by including in the agreement a provision to that effect.' 28 The apparent purpose of this "private statute of frauds" is to enable
For further discussion of commercial impracticability as it relates to contract modification, see
Hillman, supra note 15, at 897-98 & n.210.
125. See Hillman, supra note 15, at 897-98 & n.210.
126. The doctrine of mistake is available under U.C.C. § 1-103. See note 183 infra. See Hillman, supra note 15, at 898 n.212 for further discussion.
Section 2-614(1) specifically states that if the delivery term of an agreement becomes impracticable, a commercially reasonable substitute must be accepted. Since the seller would have the
right to expect the buyer to accept a reasonable substitute delivery, the issue of the seller's good
faith again is removed from the case.
The agreement that replaces the original unenforceable agreement is not technically a modification agreement because a modification agreement replaces an enforceable contract. See text
accompanying notes 54-60 supra.
127. Section 2-209(2) provides: "A signed a~reement which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between
merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by
the other party."
128. U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 3.
The rescission language in § 2-209(2) is required to make a provision barring oral modification effective. In the absence of a provision barring oral rescission as well as oral modification, the
parties could orally rescind their agreement and enter a new oral agreement that alters the original
rescinded contract, thereby circumventing the provision barring oral modification. See 1 STUDY,
supra note 2, Doc. No. 65(c), at 643, 728-29.
Professor Nordstrom suggests that the "probable result" of § 2-209(2) would be that "many
printed forms
121.will contain a no-modification-unless-in-writing" clause. R. NORDSTROM, supra
note 43, at
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contracting parties to protect themselves from inadvertent or unwise oral
agreements to modify their contracts. 129 Theoretically, a formal writing emphasizes the gravity of the decision to modify and provides time for the parties
to contemplate their decision.130 Unfortunately, the section is inartfully
worded and may not achieve its purpose.
The first clause of section 2-209(2) requires that an agreement to exclude
oral modification must be signed to be enforceable, but the clause does not
specify who must sign the agreement. Are both parties required to sign the
agreement or is it a sufficient defense that the party urging the enforceability
of an oral modification has signed the agreement? By analogy to section 2201(1), which requires that agreements for the sale of goods for $500 or more
must be "signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought," it can be
argued that only the party against whom enforcement of the provision barring
oral modification is sought-the party urging the enforceability of the oral
modification-must sign the agreement barring oral modification to make it
enforceable. Buyer signed the "contract of sale" in Problem Ten; therefore
modification is not precluded
enforcement of the provision excluding oral
13 1
under the first clause of section 2-209(2).
Under the second clause of section 2-209(2),132 a provision barring oral
modification in an agreement supplied by one merchant to another merchant
does not have to be "separately signed" by the second merchant to be enforceable, but a provision barring oral modification in an agreement supplied by a
merchant to a consumer must be separately signed by the consumer to be enforceable. 133 The specific language of section 2-209(2) does not make it clear
whether the required "separate signing" must be of the written agreement containing the provision barring oral modification or of the specific provision itself.134 Nevertheless, because the first clause of section 2-209(2) already
129. See Timbie, Modfcation of Written Contractsin Caifornia,23 HASTINGS L.J. 1549, 1551
(1972).
130. See id; A. MUELLER & A. RosETr, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 171-72 (2d
ed. 1977).
131. See also Monroe, Inc. v. Jack B. Parson Construction Co., 604 P.2d 901 (Utah 1979)
(signed writing requirement of § 2-209(2) satisfied by writing directed at third party).
Additional problems in construing the signed writing requirement of the first clause of § 2209(2) may confront its interpreters. The relationship between the section's requirement of a
signed agreement excluding oral modification and the merchant exception to the statute of frauds
in § 2-201(2) is unclear. If both Selco and Buyer were merchants, and Buyer had not signed the
contract of sale, the oral modification apparently would be enforceable under § 2-209(2). Nevertheless, § 2-201(2) states that a writing m confirmation of a contract sent by one merchant to
another, sufficient against the sender to satisfy the statute of frauds, will also satisfy the statute of
frauds as against the recipient if the recipient "has reason to know its contents" and does not give
written notice of objection within 10 days. If the agreement prepared by Selco and sent to Buyer
was "a writing in confirmation of the contract" that satisfied the statute of frauds against Selco,
perhaps § 2-201(2) should apply to uphold the provision barring oral modification. As § 2-201(2)
applies only when the recipient of the writing "has reason to know its contents," it can be argued
that the signed agreement requirement of § 2-209(2) serves little purpose when the recipient of the
agreement "has reason to know" that it contains a provision excluding oral modification.
132. "[B]ut except as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the
merchant must be separately signed by the other party." U.C.C. § 2-209(2).
133. U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 3.
134. Id. provides: "[N]ote that if a consumer is to be held to [a written modification clause] on
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requires that the written agreement be signed by the party urging enforceability of the oral modification, the second clause must be designed to add an
additional enforceability requirement-a separate signing by the consumer of
the specific provision barring oral modification. 135 If the provision itself must
be separately signed, the oral modification in Problem Ten is enforceable because Buyer signed the contract of sale but did not separately sign the provision excluding oral modification.
Presumably, the separate signing requirement is designed to protect consumers, who benefit by oral modification, by preventing provisions barring
oral modification from being buried in agreements.' 3 6 The separate signing
requirement, however, may disadvantage consumers in some situations. Suppose that in Problem Ten the oral modification was to increase the purchase
price of the freezers $50 per freezer. Under the express language of section 2209(2), the oral modification presumably would be enforceable even though
Selco had drafted the provision barring oral modification and both parties had
signed the agreement. As Buyer was a consumer and had not separately
signed the provision barring oral modification, the provision would be unenforceable. Therefore, perhaps the separate signing requirement should apply
only when a nonmerchant asserts the enforceability of an oral modification.
This interpretation would be more consistent with the presumed purpose of
section 2-209(2) to protect consumers.
In light of the infelicitous language of section 2-209(2), it is not surprising
that the courts have had difficulty construing the section. One court ignored a
written stipulation that a written modification must be signed by both parties; 13 7 another construed section 2-209(2) to require a separate signing of the
private statute of frauds provision only when both parties to the contract are
merchants. 138 Even assuming that the potential exists for more reasoned judicial opinions construing section 2-209(2), apparently a provision barring oral
modification can be waived under section 2-209(4).139 Thus, even if the provision barring oral modification were enforceable in Problem Ten, Selco still
a form supplied by a merchant, it must be separately signed." (emphasis added). Does the "it" in

the comment refer to the clause or to the form? The text of § 2-209(2) suffers from the same
ambiguity. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-209 (1965), North Carolina Comment (emphasis added):

"The last part of subsection (2) provides that a merchant-seller's contract form limiting modification by a buyer (who is not a merchant), specifying that it shall be modified only by a writing, will
not limit the nonmerchant buyer unless he separately signs the instrument containing such limitation."
135. See I STUDY, supra note 2, Doc. No. 65(c), at 643.
136. "The added provision as to a printed clause, in subsection (2), is designed to prevent

entrapment of one party by a printed required-writing clause in the other party's printed

form..... ".Id (emphasis added).
137. In re Estate of Upchurch, 62 Tenn. App. 634, 642-48, 466 S.W.2d 886, 889 (1970).
138. Trust Co. v. Montgomery, 136 Ga. App. 742, 743, 222 S.E.2d 196, 197 (1975). See also
United States Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1972), ajj'd,
509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975) (writing required when both parties are merchants).
Section 2-209(2) does not explain the requirements of a signed written modification that will
satisfy the private statute of frauds. Presumably, the minimal requirements of § 2-201 (quantity
term, signed by the party to be charged) are sufficient to satisfy § 2-209(2).
139. See Thomas Knutson Shipbuilding Corp. v. George W. Rodgers Constr. Co., 6 U.C.C.
REP. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk County 1969); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Pillow, 582 S.W.2d 77 (Tenn.
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could be held to the oral modification if it constituted a section 2-209(4)
waiver. The awkwardness of section 2-209(2) and the availability of the
waiver argument under section 2-209(4) dilute any protection afforded contracting parties by the private statute of frauds of section 2-209(2).
PROBLEM ELEVEN
In a writingsignedby both Selco andBuyco, Buyco ordersfive slush
freezersfor $10,000. The writing contains a clause stating that Selco
has agreednot to include certainpartsthat ordinarilyare sold with the
freezersfor an additional$400. Before delivery Buyco orally ordersthe
parts,andSelco agreesto deliver them. Upon delivery Buyco takes the
freezers but is unwilling to take the parts. Selco seeks damagesfor
Buyco's refusal to take theparts.

A party may have abundant evidence of intent to modify a contract, but
in the absence of a writing memorializing the modification agreement, the
agreement may not be enforceable under the statute of frauds of section 2209(3). 140 The purpose of the modification statue of frauds is to "protect
against false allegations of oral modifications."' 14 1 Like subsection (2) of section 2-209,142 because of poor drafting and the waiver provision of section 2209(4), section 2-209(3) has resulted in more confusion than certainty.
The section 2-209(3) requirement of satisfaction of the statute of frauds
when the contract as modified is within the provisions of section 2-201 is open
to many plausible interpretations. These different interpretations can be seen
in the context of Problem Eleven. First, because the parties' original contract
for the sale of slush freezers was within section 2-201 (more than $500),143 it
can be argued that the oral agreement to supply the parts for $400 is also
within section 2-201 and requires a writing because the total contract price is
still greater than $500. 44 Second, it can be argued that no writing is required
because the modification agreement to supply the parts was for less than $500.
Third, section 2-209(3) indicates that section 2-201 must be satisfied if the contract "as modified" is within section 2-201. Perhaps no writing is required in
Problem Eleven because the modification does not bring the contract (as modified) within the statute of frauds for the first time. Fourth, because the only
term that must appear in writing under section 2-201 is the quantity term,
perhaps only modifications that alter that term require a writing.145 Thus,
App. 1979); text accompanying notes 170-203 infra. See also Note, Oral Modification of Sales
Contracts and the Statute of Frauds, 21 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 602-05 (1972).
140. Section 2-209(3) provides: "The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this article (section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions."
141. U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 3.
142. See text accompanying notes 127-139 supra.
143. See note 55 supra.
144. See, e.g.,
Van Den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 576 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1978).
The New York Law Revision Commission apparently adopted this view of § 2-209(3). 1 STUDY,
supra note 2, Doc. No. 65(c), at 643.
145. But see R. NoRDsTRoM, supra note 43, at 123. Professors White and Summers mention
the alternatives discussed in the text and others:
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because Selco and Buyco did not modify the quantity term-the agreement is
still for five slush freezers-perhaps their oral agreement is enforceable.
In interpreting section 2-209(3) to determine when a modification is
"within" section 2-201, courts must balance the contribution made by the writing requirement against the need to avoid technicalities barring enforcement
of voluntary modifications. It will be argued later in this Article that, at least
in the modification context, the statute of frauds is not very effective in combating fraud and that other approaches may suffice to police against fraudulent allegations of oral modification.1 46 Thus, because contracting parties
often modify their agreements informally,147 and because the charge of the
Code is responsiveness to commercial realities,148 more harm than good emanates from a stringent statute of frauds approach.14 9 Courts, therefore, should
interpret section 2-209(3) narrowly to require a writing only when the modification itself is for an amount greater than $500 and involves the quantity term.
Under this interpretation of section 2-209(3), the oral agreement between
Selco and Buyco in Problem Eleven would be enforceable.

If under section 2-209(3) a modification is "within" section 2-201, how is
section 2-201 satisfied? Presumably all of the rules and exceptions to the writing requirement of section 2-201 would apply to modification agreements. 150
For example, the section 2-209(3) statute of frauds could be satisfied under
section 2-201(3)(b) by an admission in court that a modification agreement
exists 15 1 or under section 2-201(3)(c) by acceptance of goods after oral modification.' 52 Furthermore, even if the modification is "within" the provisions of
Section 2-209(3) states that "[tihe requirements of the statute of frauds section of this
Article (2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions." The
impact of this provision is not clear. We see at least the following possible interpretations: (1) that if the original contract was within 2-201, any modification thereof must
also be in writing; (2) that a modification must be in writing if the term it adds brings the
entire deal within 2-201 for the first time, as where the price is modified from $400 to
$500; (3) that a modification must be in writing if it falls in 2-201 on its own; (4) that the
modification must be in writing if it changes the quantity term of an original agreement
that fell within 2-201; and (5) some combination of the foregoing. Given the purposes of
the basic statute of frauds section 2-201, we believe interpretations (2), (3), and (4), are
each justified, subject, of course, to the exceptions in 2-201 itself and to any general
supplemental principles of estoppel.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 44-45.
146. See text accompanying notes 195-203 infra.
147. "[Elxperience in every jurisdiction that has enacted a statute barring oral modification of
written contracts demonstrates that, no matter how explicit the statutory prohibition, private parties will continue to make and rely on. . . oral agreement." Timbie, supra note 129 at 1575-76.
See also id at 1551. The many cases dealing with oral modification under the U.C.C. bear out
Timbie's point. See, eg., In re Humboldt Fir, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Cal. 1977); cases cited
at notes 176 and 181 infra. See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 43; Levie, supra
note 11, at 355-61; Patterson, An Apologyfor Consideration,58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 936 (1958).
148. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b); Kirst,supra note 47, at 812-13, authorities cited 870 n.141. Cf.
Timbie, supra note 129, at 1551 (policy considerations weigh against a strict rule barring oral
modification). See also note 4 supra.
149. See text accompanying notes 195-203 infra for further evaluation of the statute of frauds
in the modification context.
150. See U.C.C. § 2-201; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 54-72.
151. E.g., Dangerfield v. Markel, 252 N.W.2d 184, 189 (N.D. 1977).
152. See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 43, at 123.
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section 2-201, the requirement of a writing can be waived under section 2of this section contributes to
209(4). As will be discussed later, the availability
53
the dilution of the impact of 2-209(3).1
PROBLEM TWELVE
On February15, Selco andBuyco enter into a written agreementfor
the sale to Buyco offive slush freezersfor $10,000, with delivery on
March 15. On February20, Selco notifies Buyco orally that it will be
unable to deliver until April 15 because of a delay in recept of raw
materialsfromits supplier. Buyco responds orally on February21 that
it will accept thefreezers on April 15. Buyco accepts delivery of the
freezers when tendered on April 15, but later brings an action against
Selco for damages resultingfrom the delay in delivery.
Assuming that Buyco intended to accept a modification of the agreement
and did not agree to the delay in delivery merely to minimize loss, 154 does the
oral response of Buyco on February 21 constitute an acceptance of an agreement to modify? Although the promise to accept the freezers one month late
was not supported by consideration, we have seen that section 2-209(1) eliminates that requirement. 155 Furthermore, section 2-209(3) may not require a
writing for an enforceable modification agreement. 156 Even if section 2-209(3)
required a writing, Buyco may have waived the March 15 delivery date under
section 2-209(4) or section 1-103.157 Despite these arguments in Selco's favor,
section 1-107 of the Code 158 could be read to supersede sections 2-209 and 1103 and to require a writing for the enforceability of Buyco's promise to accept
late delivery.' 59 In the absence of consideration, section 1-107 seems to require a signed written waiver or renunciation to discharge a "claim or right
arising out of an alleged breach."' 60 Under this interpretation of section 1153. See note 194 and accompanying text infra.
154. See text accompanying notes 95-102 supra. Assume further that Selco's duty to deliver
on time was not commercially impracticable under § 2-615. See text accompanying notes 124-126
supra.
155. See notes 112-122 and accompanying text supra.
156. The modification agreement in Problem Twelve does not come within § 2-201 for the first
time, it does not affect the quantity term, and it may be less than $500 in value. See notes 144-45
and accompanying text supra.
157. Section 2-209(4) and § 1-103 waivers are discussed in text accompanying notes 170-203
infra.
158. Section 1-107 provides: "Any claim or right arising out of an alleged breach can be
discharged in whole or in part without consideration by a written waiver or renunciation signed
and delivered by the aggrieved party."
159. See, e.g., Gorge Lumber Co. v. Brazier Lumber Co., 6 Wash. App. 327, 493 P.2d 782, 788
(1972). See also I W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 162-63 (1964). At common law, waiver of anticipatory breach did not require a writing\
even in the absence of new consideration. See, e.g., Gorge Lumber Co. v. Brazier Lumber Co., 6.

Wash. App. 327, 493 P.2d 782, 788 (1972). Apparently any act indicating an election to continue'
performance after material breach constituted a waiver of the breach. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Helex,
Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1306, 1313-14 (Ct. Cl.1976). Query whether § 1-107 displaces the
common-law rule. See notes 160-67 and accompanying text infra.
160. See note 158 supra. Note that an actual breach is not required under § 1-107, merely an
alleged breach.
Waiver and renunciation under § 1-107 are apparently indistinguishable. The Comment to

NORTH CAROLINA LA4W REVIEW[l

[Vol. 59

107, if Selco's notification that it could not deliver on time was an anticipatory

repudiation 16 1 and Buyco treats the repudiation as a present breach, 162 Selco's
duty to deliver on time would not be discharged even if Buyco's oral commu-

would have sufnication that it would take the freezers on April 15 otherwise
163
ficed as an acceptance of an offer to modify or a waiver.

Section 1-107 probably should not be read to preclude the enforcement of
section 2-209 oral agreements and section 2-209(4) waivers in breach and repudiation situations. Instead, perhaps the section represents only one method
of relinquishing claims arising out of breach or repudiation. Under this interpretation, agreements to modify and waivers constituting attempts at modification also could suffice as methods of relinquishing claims for breach or for
anticipatory repudiation. 164 When the evidence clearly supports a finding that
the parties intended to enter into a modification agreement, this interpretation
would be in accord with the policy of the Code to disregard technicalities and

to enforce the intent of the parties. 165 Another method of enforcing the oral
modification in Problem Twelve would be to restrict the written waiver re§

1-107 indicates that consideration is not required for an "effective renunciation or waiver of
rights or claims. . . where such renunciation is in writing and signed and delivered by the aggrieved party." (Emphasis added). The New York Law Revision report on § 1-107 stated that
"'renunciation' seems to be the same thing as 'release,' a manifestation of intent to discharge." I
STUDY, supra note 2, at 203.
161. In determining whether Selco's notification of February 20 was an anticipatory repudiation the court would look to § 2-6 10 of the Code. Section 2-6 10 provides in part:
When either party repudiates the contract with respect to a performance not yet due the
loss of which will substantially impair the value of the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance by the repudiating party; or
(b) resort to any remedy for breach. . . and (c) in either case suspend his own performance ....

The section is silent on how to determine whether a given comunication is a repudiation or is
merely an attempt to negotiate a modification. Comment 1 offers some help: "Anticipatory repudiation centers upon an overt communication of intention or an action which renders performance
impossible or demonstrates a clear determination not to continue with performance." See also
Jon-T Farms, Inc. v. Goodpasture, 554 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (repudiation occurs
when one party declares that he will not perform or will perform only on conditions that go
beyond the contract). A finding of anticipatory repudiation also requires a showing that the delay
in delivery would "substantially impair the value of the whole contract" to Buyco. Section 2-610
suggests a subjective test of substantial impairment. A court could refer to common-law material
breach cases to determine whether the delay in Problem Twelve would constitute substantial impairment. See, e.g., Allen v. Wolf River Lumber Co., 169 Wis. 253, 172 N.W. 158 (1919).
162. See U.C.C. §§ 2-610(b), 2-711(1).
163. See, e.g., Gorge Lumber Co. v. Brazier Lumber Co., 6 Wash. App. 327, 493 P.2d 782, 787
(1972).
164. The Official Comment to § 1-107 is unclear on whether the section was meant to preempt
§ 2-209 in breach and repudiation situations. The Comment states that "there may. . . be an oral
renunciation or waiver sustained by consideration. . . subject to. . . Section 2-209," suggesting
that waivers of breach or repudiation in the absence of consideration are controlled by § 1-107.
The Comment, however, adds that, "[a]s is made express in [§ 2-209] this Act fully recognizes the
effectiveness of waiver and estoppel," suggesting, perhaps, that § 1-107 is not meant to preclude
oral waivers, even of a breach or repudiation, under § 2-209.
A good argument can be made that § 1-103 common-law oral waivers of claims for breach or
repudiation without consideration were meant to be displaced by § 1-107. If an aggrieved party
can orally waive claims arising from breach or repudiation without consideration, § 1-107 would
appear to have little purpose.
165. See U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 1.
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quirement of section 1-107 to cases of actual or alleged breach by the nonwaiving party, not repudiation.
Interpreting section 1-107 to require a written waiver or renunciation as
the only method of surrendering a claim or right arising out of a breach or
repudiation may serve one useful purpose. Assume that in Problem Twelve
Buyco had agreed to the delay in delivery only to minimize loss. Under section 1-207, it should be recalled, Buyco's failure to "explicitly" reserve the
right to seek damages for breach may raise the presumption that it had entered
into an enforceable accord and satisfaction. 166 By requiring a written waiver
of the claim by Buyco, section 1-107 seemingly would protect Buyco from inadvertently losing its claim against Selco even though Buyco did not explicitly
reserve its rights. Assuming that Buyco did not affirmatively mislead Selco,
Buyco probably should be protected in this situation.
It appears that sections 1-107 and 1-207 may conflict in the context of
Problem Twelve. In the absence of an explicit reservation of rights by Buyco,
section 1-207 may raise the presumption that Buyco agreed to a modification
of the time for performance. Section 1-107, however, may require a signed
written waiver of Buyco's right to cease performance and seek damages for
Selco's repudiation, and therefore, without such a writing, Buyco's "promise"
to accept the freezers on April 15 would have no legal effect. This conflict
probably should be resolved by enforcing the intent of the parties as evidenced
by their communications and the surrounding circumstances, regardless of
whether there was an "explicit" reservation of rights or the absence of a communication that constituted a "written waiver or renunciation." This result
could be achieved by construing section 1-107 to represent only one method of
relinquishing rights' 67 or by excluding anticipatory repudiation situations
from its coverage. By the same token, section 1-207 must be construed as containing one, but not the only, method of reserving rights, in order to protect
parties that go forward in the face of breach only to minimize loss. While
these interpretations restrict sections 1-107 and 1-207, they are consistent with
the need to mirror the commercial world that does not always observe the
formalities of explicit reservations and written waivers.' 6 8
The Code does not make clear whether the writing requirement of section
1-107 itself can be waived. An analogy to section 2-209 can be made to support such a proposition. Both sections 2-209(3) and 1-107 set forth writing
requirements for a contracting party to give up rights. Since the statute of
frauds provision of section 2-209(3) can be waived, 169 perhaps the statute of
frauds provision of section 1-107 also can be waived.
166. See notes 100-102 and accompanying text supra.
167. But see Gorge Lumber Co. v. Brazier Lumber Co., 6 Wash. App. 327, 493 P.2d 782
(1972); 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 159, at 162-63.
168. See notes 147-148 and accompanying text supra.
169. See text accompanying notes 170-203 infra.
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Waiver andEstoppel

PROBLEM THIRTEEN
In a writingsignedby both Selco andBuyco, Buyco ordersfive slush
freezersfor $10,000. The writing contains a clause stating that Selco
has agreednot to include certainparts that ordinarilyare sold with the
freezersfor an additional$400. Before delivery, Buyco orally orders
theparts,andSelco agrees to deliver them. Upon delivery Buyco takes
thefreezers but is unwilling to take theparts. Selco seeks damagesfor
Buyco's refusal to take theparts.

In Problem Eleven these facts were analyzed to determine whether the
order of the parts required a writing to be enforceable. For Problem Thirteen
we will assume that a court has found that a writing was required. Nevertheless, Selco still can claim that Buyco's oral order of the parts and Selco's agreement to deliver them "operate as a waiver" under section 2-209(4) of the
Code.170

The first task in evaluating Selco's claim is to determine what conduct
"can operate as a waiver" under section 2-209(4). Unfortunately, the term
"waiver" has many common-law meanings, 17 1 and its usage in section 2209(4) has contributed to problems in interpreting the section. At common
law "waiver" referred to an intentional relinquishment of a right or advantage
supported by consideration; a relinquishment of a right followed by reliance
on the relinquishment (reliance or estoppel
waiver); and a unilateral relin72
quishment of a right (unilateral waiver).'

The first two common-law definitions of waiver, requiring, respectively,
consideration to support, or reliance on, the relinquishment of a right, seem
more restrictive than the Code approach. Section 2-209(4) by its express terms
includes "attempt[s] at modification or rescission" that fail under section 2209(2) or (3).173 The Code does not define this language, but apparently it
refers to modification agreements under section 2-209(1), like the agreement
between Selco and Buyco in Problem Thirteen, that do not satisfy the statute
of frauds of section 2-209(2) or (3). Because modification agreements need not
be supported by consideration nor must they be relied on, presumably no con170. Section 2-209(4) provides: "Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not
satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver."
171. See, e.g., Gorge Lumber Co. v. Brazier Lumber Co., 6 Wash. App. 327, 493 P.2d 782
(1972); 3 WILLISTON § 679, at 257-58 (3d ed. 1961).
172. See, e.g., McNamara v. Miller, 269 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (estoppel waiver); Farmers
Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175, 178, 552 P.2d 63, 65 (1976) (unilateral waiver); Carfi v.
DeMartino, 181 Misc. 428, 46 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1944) (unilateral waiver); Voelker v. Joseph, 62
Wash. 2d 429, 383 P.2d 301 (1963) (consideration waiver). See also R. NORDSTROM, supra note
43, at 124.
173. See, e.g., Gorge Lumber Co. v. Brazier Lumber Co., 6 Wash. Ap. 327, 493 P.2d 782, 78788 (1972). See also 1 STUDY, supra note 2, Doc. No. 65(c), at 644-45. In In re Humboldt Fir, Inc.,
426 F. Supp. 292, 297 (N.D. Cal. 1977), for example, seller granted two extensions for the taking
of timber by buyer. The second extension was not executed, but it was held to operate as a waiver
under § 2-209(4).
The New York Law Revision Commission suggested that the term "attempt at modification"
was too restrictive. I STUDY, supra note 2, Doc. No. 65(c), at 645.

CONTRACT MODIFICATION UNDER THE UCC

1981]

365

sideration or reliance is required to constitute an "attempt at modification or
rescission" under section 2-209(4). In addition, section 2-209(5) states that section 2-209(4) waivers of executory terms may be retracted unless materially
relied on, suggesting that section 2-209(4) waivers may exist without reliance. 174 Of course, the opportunity for the waiving party to retract section 2209(4) waivers that have not been relied on diminishes the importance of non175
reliance waivers.
While the first two definitions of waiver may be more restrictive than the
Code usage, the third definition, requiring a unilateral relinquishment of a
right, seems broader than the Code approach. If the "attempt at modification
or rescission" language does mean that section 2-209(4) requires an agreement
that fails to satisfy the writing requirements of section 2-209(2) or (3), then the
section requires more than a showing of a unilateral relinquishment of a
right.

176

If modification agreements that fail under section 2-209(2) or (3) "can
operate as waiver[s]" even without reliance on them or consideration,' 77 do al
such modification agreements "operate as waiver[s]"? If all modification
agreements that fail to satisfy section 2-209(2) or (3) are enforceable as waivers, section 2-209(2) and (3) seem to have little utility other than making oral
modification agreements that require a writing under them subject to retraction until materially relied on. 178 Presumably, the drafters intended a greater
role for these sections.
Perhaps the drafters intended to preclude from enforcement as waivers
"attempt[s] at modification" that consist of oral agreements to add entirely
79
new terms (in contrast to agreements to delete or change existing terms).'
This interpretation of section 2-209(4) not only is consistent with each of the
174. See MuRRAY,supra note 43, at 187. See also notes 216-23 and accompanying text infra.
175. In Problem 13, for example, Buyco could have retracted the order of the parts until they
were delivered. Assuming that delivery constitutes reliance on the parts order, after delivery it is
irrelevant to the question of the enforceability of the parts order whether § 2-209(4) includes waivers that have not been relied on. Nevertheless, the availability of non-reliance waivers under § 2209(4) would be crucial in some situations. For example, suppose the contract between Selco and
Buyco contained an arbitration provision but the parties agreed to delete the provision in a subsequent oral agreement that is held to be unenforceable under § 2-209(3). If either party then fails
to perform and the other (who cannot show reliance on the agreement to avoid arbitration) seeks a
judicial resolution of the dispute, the court's decision whether to compel arbitration will be based
on whether the agreement to avoid arbitration was enforceable under § 2-209(4) as a non-reliance
waiver.
176. See, e.g., J.T. Jenkins Co. v. Kennedy, 45 Cal. App. 3d 474, 483, 119 Cal. Rptr. 578, 584
(1975); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175, 180, 552 P.2d 63, 66 (1976); Gold Kist,
Inc. v. Pillow, 582 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tenn. App. 1979). See also Franklin Grain & Supply Co. v.
App. 3d 740, 743, 358 N.E.2d 922, 925 (1976) (acceptance of late delivery of fertiIngrain, 44 Ill.
lizer held to be "compulsory;" therefore no waiver of time for performance term); Barbarossa &
Sons, Inc. v. Iten Chevrolet, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 655, 661-62 (1978) (affirmative oral acquiescence to
a later delivery date insufficient to extend the delivery term because of the lack of a writing under
§ 2-209).
177. Waivers may also be established under U.C.C. § 2-208(3). See text accompanying notes
204-215 infra.
178. See text accompanying notes 188-193 infra for a further discussion of the effect of conduct operating as a waiver.
179. See, eg., U.C.C. § 2-207(1) and (2) (Code recognition of the difference between addi-
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common-law definitions of waiver that require relinquishment of a right or an
advantage, but it also preserves an important function for section 2-209(2) and
(3). In Problem Thirteen, for example, the parties' oral agreement to delete
the "no parts" provision would "operate as a waiver" under this interpretation. If the parties had agreed orally to an entirely new term, such as an arbitration provision, however, the oral agreement would not operate as a
waiver.180 Because most oral modification agreements involve the deletion or
alteration of existing terms,' 8' interpreting section 2-209(4) in this fashion
should not impede enforcement of most voluntary modifications. Furthermore, by requiring a writing to enforce agreements to add entirely new terms,
situations that, because of
some protection may be afforded against fraud in
i8 2
their relative infrequency, may be more suspect.
Despite some evidence that the drafters intended section 2-209(4) to chart
its own waiver course, section 1-103 still might permit one (or more) of the
common-law definitions of waiver to apply to disputes such as Problem Thirteen. For example, even if unilateral waivers are not within section 2-209(4),
they may supplement the Code under section 1-103. Suppose that Buyco had
expressed its willingness to waive the "no parts" clause and to accept the parts
but that Selco had not responded or relied in any way. Selco could argue that
Buyco had waived the "no parts" clause and that the waiver was enforceable
under section 1-103. Although section 2-209(4) is inartfully worded, perhaps
the "attempt at modification or rescission" language of the section, which suggests that an agreement is required, is meant to preclude unilateral waivers
from supplementing the rules of contract modification. 18 3 Nevertheless, if
tional and different terms). See also Double-E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 488 F.2d

292, 298 (3rd Cir. 1973) (Garth, J., dissenting).
Another explanation for the "can operate as a waiver" language is that the drafters intended
that reliance on the "attempt at modification" or consideration would be necessary before the
"attempt at modification" did operate as a waiver. The reasons for concluding that reliance or
consideration are not necessary, discussed in text accompanying notes 173-75, refute this argument.
Still another explanation for the "can operate as a waiver" language is that the drafters used
that language solely because they were mindful that § 2-209(4) waivers can be retracted unless
materially relied on under § 2-209(5). The difficulty with this explanation is that it would broaden
the availability of waiver at the expense of limiting severely the domain of § 2-209(2) and (3). See
text accompanying note 178 supra.
180. It is possible to argue that the party opposing arbitration waived the right not to have the
arbitration provision included in the agreement. This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with
the common-law approach to waiver, overemphasizes the implication of silence, and permits the
enforcement of virtually all oral agreements that fail to satisfy § 2-209(2) and (3).
181. Most of the reported cases involve alteration of the time for performance. See, e.g., In re
Humboldt Fir, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Trust Co. v. Montgomery, 136 Ga. App.
742, 222 S.E.2d 196 (1975); Franklin Grain & Supply v. Ingram, 44 Ill. App. 3d 740, 358 N.E.2d
922 (1976); Barbarossa & Sons, Inc. v. Iten Chevrolet, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1978); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175, 552 P.2d 63 (1976); Mott Equity Elevator v.
Svihovec, 236 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1975); Wilson v. Gifford-Hill & Co., Inc., 570 P.2d 624 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1977). See also West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 377 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Ala. 1974)
(modification of price term).
182. Oral agreements to add new terms that are relied on may be enforceable under the common-law doctrine of promissory estoppel. See text accompanying note 185 in/Pa.
183. Section 1-103 provides in part: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act,
the principles of law and equity ... shall supplement its provisions." To the extent that outside
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Selco could not show an agreement to modify, but could show that it reasonably relied on a waiver of the "no parts" provision, then perhaps the waiver is
enforceable under section 1-103. Waivers that are reasonably relied on in the
absence of agreement should supplement section 2-209(4) because the section
184
probably is not intended to displace the general doctrine of estoppel.
Many recent common-law cases have used promissory estoppel principles
to enforce promises made as a part of oral bargains that are unenforceable
under the statute of frauds. 185 When the grounds for estoppel are present,
should this approach supplement section 2-209(4) to permit the enforcement of
oral modification agreements to add entirely new terms? Although an affirmative response diminishes the importance of section 2-209(2) and (3), little reason exists for insulating the statute of frauds from the promissory estoppel
argument in the modification context when the statute of frauds is subject to
the promissory estoppel approach in original agreement formation situations.
In addition, the policies of enforcing the actual agreement made between parties and avoiding technicalities of modification mandate that the promissory
estoppel approach supplement section 2-209(4). This approach does not conflict with the position that section 2-209(4) precludes "attempts at modification" that consist of oral agreements to add new terms. 186 Although these oral
agreements may be enforceable under the promissory estoppel approach, detrimental reliance must be shown, and the remedy may be different than if the
agreement were enforced as a section 2-209(4) "attempt at modification." If
the oral agreement to add a new term were enforceable under section 2-209(4),
the remedy probably would be geared to the expectancy of the party receiving
the waiver. Under section 1-103, however, the remedy is "to be limited as
87
justice requires" and may consist of a reliance recovery only.'
Assuming that it is possible to determine when conduct "operates" as a
waiver under section 2-209(4), the next question is what is the effect of conduct
"operating" as a waiver? Is the waiver of the statute of frauds or of the execulaw has not been explicitly displaced by the Code, it supplements the Code under § 1-103.
Whether a specific provision of the Code displaces outside law often is difficult to determine. See
generally Hillman, supra note 4. That article suggests that the Code text and its purposes and
policies must be considered to determine whether outside law has been displaced. Thus, because
§ 2-209(4) specifically refers to "attempt[s] at modification," and because § 2-209 includes statute
of frauds provisions, it can be argued that § 2-209(4) displaces unilateral waivers, which would not

require an attempt at modification and would render the writing requirements impotent.

184. See Summers, GeneralEquitable Princples under Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. L. REV. 906, 913 (1978).

Although § 2-209(5) states that waivers that are materially relied on cannot be retracted, see
notes 222-223 and accompanying text infra, the section does not prove that reliance waivers without agreement are intended to supplement the Code. If under § 2-209(4) modification agreements
that fail to satisfy the statute of frauds "operate" as waivers, perhaps the term waiver in § 2-209(5)
is referring only to these oral modification agreements. Section 2-209(5) could mean only that oral
agreements that fail to satisfy the statute of frauds can be retracted until relied on. Nevertheless,
by recognizing the doctrine of estoppel, § 2-209(5) lends credence to the argument that estoppel
also should supplement § 2-209(4).
185. See, e.g., Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Iowa 1979);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 217A (Tent. Draft 1-7, 1973).
186. See notes 179-182 and accompanying text supra.

187. See

RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 217(1) & (2) (Tent. Draft 1-7, 1973).
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tory term of the contract that is the subject of the modification?18 8 Some cases
have supported the view that "an attempt at modification" under section 2209(4) operates as a waiver of the statute of frauds.1 89 Presumably, once it is
found to exist, the oral modification agreement that constitutes the "attempt at
modification" then is enforceable without further evidence.19 0 Other cases involving agreements that have included provisions barring oral modification
have supported the view that an oral modification agreement is effective under
section 2-209(4) if, and only if, a specific intent to waive the statute of frauds of
section 2-209(2) is found. 19 1 Still other cases have taken the position that an
attempted modification, ineffective under section 2-209(2) or (3), can operate
term of the contract that was the subject of the
as a waiver of the executory
192
attempted modification.
Because parties freely negotiating to modify particular terms of an agreement presumably intend their oral modifications to be enforceable, 193 perhaps
modification agreements that do not satisfy the statute of frauds implicitly lead
to waivers, both of the term that is the subject of the modification and of the
statute of frauds. Under this interpretation, Selco would present evidence of
the oral agreement and would claim that the agreement constituted a waiver of
both the term refusing the parts and the statute of frauds. Of course, this interpretation further dilutes the writing requirements of section 2-209(2) and (3)
by broadening the availability of the section 2-209(4) waiver argument-no
specific waiver of the statute of frauds would have to be shown.
The stated purpose of section 2-209(3)-to avoid "false allegations of oral
modification"-is served, if at all, only by a narrow interpretation of section 2209(4). We have seen that section 2-209(4) is sufficiently vague so that courts
attempting to find efficiency in section 2-209(2) and (3) can interpret section 2209(4) to encompass only oral agreements to change existing terms, to require
evidence of intent to waive the statute of frauds, and even to require reliance
or consideration.' 9 4 Courts also can interpret section 2-209(4) to bar common188. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 43, at 124; see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 53.
189. See, e.g., Double-E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 488 F.2d 292, 297 n.7 (3rd
Cir. 1973); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175, 178-80, 552 P.2d 63, 65-66 (1976).
190. But see Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175, 181, 552 P.2d 63, 66 (1976).
191. See, e.g., Indussa Corp. v. Reliable Stainless Steel Supply Co., 369 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa.
1974); C.I.T. Corp. v. Jonnett, 419 Pa. 435, 439, 214 A.2d 620, 622 (1965).

192. E.g., Double-E. Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 488 F.2d 292, 296 (3rd Cir. 1973)
(dissenting opinion); J.T. Jenkins Co. v. Kennedy, 45 Cal. App. 3d 474, 483, 119 Cal. Rptr. 578,
584 (1975); Mott Equity Elevator v. Svihovec, 236 N.W.2d 900, 907 (N.D. 1975) (dictum). See
also U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 4. Some commentators believe that this Comment supports the
view that the waiver is of the statute of frauds. See I R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-209:13 (2d ed. 1970); R. NORDSTROM, supra note 43, at 124. Section 2-209(5) states that
"a party who has made a waiver affecting an executoryportionof the contract" (emphasis added)

can retract that waiver, suggesting that a § 2-209(4) waiver is of an executory term and not of the
statute of frauds.
193. See note 147 and accompanying text supra.
194. See text accompanying notes 170-203 supra. The New York Law Revision Commission
apparently believed that § 2-209(4) waivers require reliance. See I STUDY, supra note 2, at 644.
But see R. NORDSTROM, supra note 43, at 124: "[W]aiver is a sufficiently ambiguous word so that
courts can admit evidence of almost any alleged oral modification to see whether that evidence-

although not sufficient to operate as a modification in and of iself-will 'operate' as a waiver."
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law supplementation under section 1-103. Courts that are inclined to restrict
the availability of waiver, however, should balance the contribution made by

the writing requirement against the need to avoid technicalities barring the
enforcement of freely made modification agreements.

The policy arguments in favor of statute of frauds provisions in the context of modification law are not overly persuasive. Will the statute of frauds
avoid fraudulent allegations of oral modification? 195 With the existence of a

waiver provision, protection against fraud is problematical because a party can
fraudulently assert that an oral waiver has been made. Even if there were no

waiver provision, the protection-against-fraud rationale for section 2-209(3) is
suspect. First, the presence of a signed writing does not prove that a modification actually was made. The signature may have been forged or made at a
preliminary stage of negotiations. 196 Second, because parties frequently mod-

ify their agreements orally, the potential for fraud may be increased by the
statute of frauds. Parties who actually have entered into an oral modification

agreement but then find themselves in litigation may be tempted to allege

falsely that no modification has been made. 197 Third, the potential for fraud

can be diminished without resorting to the statute of frauds. If the burden of
persuasion is placed on the modification proponent to demonstrate that the

parties reached agreement on modification, presumably bare allegations of
modification will be insufficient. Our jury system should be a sufficient check

on the potential for fraud. Flexibility in the law of contract modification
should not be sacrificed for fear that the jury system cannot weed out those
guilty of fraud and perjury. 198

A second general policy argument in favor of the statute of frauds is that
it increases certainty by making clear to the parties and to the courts the nature

of the agreement between the parties. 199 Again, this argument is inadequate.
The Code's minimal writing requirement for both contract and modification
2 °°
formation hardly leads to clear written agreements.
A third policy argument in favor of the statute of frauds is that it empha-

sizes the seriousness of the transaction and may prevent parties from entering

into coerced or foolish (but binding) modification agreements. 20 1 A party who
195. See U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 3. The dispute over whether the statute of frauds serves a
useful purpose is, of course, not new. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 7274; Corbin, The Uniform Commerical Code-Sales;Should It Be Enacted, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 82934 (1950); Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-4nEssay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 747
(1931); Note, The Status of a "No Oral Modification" Clause Under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 314, 318-19 (1969).
196. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 73.
197. Id; Timbie, supra note 129, at 1576.
198. Courts usually will enforce alterations of contracts made orally and will ignore the statute
of frauds if they are convinced that an alteration has been agreed on. See, e.g., Gold Kist, Inc. v.
Pillow, 582 S.W.2d 77 (Tenn. App. 1979)..In GoldKist, despite a written agreement barring oral
modification, the court used § 2-209(4) and "equitable principles" to enforce an oral alteration of
the contract that never was denied by the party asserting the statute of frauds.
199. See Timbie, supra note 129, at 1575.
200. See U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
201. See Timbie, supra note 129, at 1550-51. Perhaps the drafters felt that statute of frauds
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is subject to coercion, however, can be coerced into entering an unfair modification and into signing a writing that satisfies the statute of frauds. The absence of a writing does not prove that a modification agreement was
involuntarily made, just as the presence of a writing does not prove that a
modification was voluntarily made. The rules of economic duress are simply a
better safeguard against coercion than the statute of frauds. In addition, it is
highly questionable whether a writing requirement can persuade a party not to
enter into a foolish modification agreement. Even assuming that a writing can
"snap" a party out of foolishness, the party is not protected because of the
opportunity to waive rights foolishly under section 2-209(4).
While the shortcomings of the statute of frauds in the modification context may outweigh its contributions, thereby suggesting that a broad approach
to section 2-209(4) is proper, it could be argued that the availability of waiver
at least should be limited in situations in which the parties have included a
provision barring oral modification in their agreement under section 2-209(2).
In that situation the Code policy in favor of freedom of contract 20 2 suggests
that parties should be permitted to restrict the procedures for altering their
contracts. Nevertheless, Comment 4 to section 2-209 directly suggests that section 2-209(4) was drafted to prevent provisions barring oral modification from
restricting "the legal effect of the parties' actual later conduct." In addition,
when it is clear that the parties have intended to alter their agreement, freedom of contract is served by enforcing the alteration. Accordingly, section 2209(4) should be interpreted broadly, regardless of whether the parties have
20 3
included a provision barring oral modification in their original agreement.
Because the commercial reality is that parties frequently and informally
efiter into voluntary oral alterations of their agreements, because the stated
goal of section 2-209 is to facilitate the enforcement of these agreements, and
because the statute of frauds may serve little purpose (at least in the modification context), the waiver provision of section 2-209(4) should be interpreted
broadly. In light of commercial practices, a proper balancing of the need for
flexibility and certainty is achieved by interpreting section 2-209(4) to permit
enforcement of "attempts at modification" that consist of oral agreements to
change or delete existing terms, to enforce these agreements without consideration or reliance and without specific evidence that the parties intended to
waive the statute of frauds, and to permit common-law supplementation of
section 2-209(4) by reliance waivers in the absence of agreement and by promissory estoppel.
PROBLEM FOURTEEN
Selco andBuyeo enter into a written contractforthe sale to Buyco of
provisions were needed to close the floodgates opened by the repudiation of the preexisting duty
rule. See Note, supra note 195, at 318-19.
202. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3).
203. See notes 127-139 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the operation of
U.C.C. § 2-209(2).
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five slush freezers. They agree that one slushfreezer will be delivered
on thefirst of each monthforfive months. For thefirst three months
Selco delivers on the thirdof the month, andBuyco accefpts on that date
withoutprotest. Buyco refuses to accept thefourth delivery that is also
two days late. Selco claims that Buyco's acceptance of the first three
deliveries on the thirdof the month constitutes an enforceablecourse of
performance between the parties.
Section 2-208(3) states that a course of performance inconsistent with an

express term "shall be relevant to show a waiver or modification" of the
term. 2°4 Many courts have found that a section 2-209(4) waiver may consist of
a course of performance established by section 2-208(3).205 The course of performance must be "accepted" or "acquiesced in without objection." 20 6 Con-

tinuing performance while objecting to the other party's performance,
therefore, should not be considered a waiver.20 7 In Problem Fourteen Buyco

acquiesced in the late deliveries and may have established a course of performance that will serve as a waiver of the original delivery term.

Some problems of interpretation arise in construing sections 2-208 and 2209 together. First, section 2-208(2) states that "express terms shall control
course of performance" when the two are inconsistent. 20 Does this provision
breathe new life into the express delivery term in Problem Fourteen?20 9 Sec-

tion 2-208 attempts to treat differently course of performance evidence offered
to establish the meaning of a writing (section 2-208(1)) and course of performance evidence offered to establish a waiver of a term of a writing (section 2208(3)).210 Apparently the drafters of the Code intended that the priority rule
of section 2-208(2) should be applied only when course of performance evi-

dence is offered to determine the meaning of a writing under section 2-208(l)
and not to establish a waiver of a term under section 2-208(3).211 They apparently failed to realize that when the proffered course of performance conflicts
with the writing, the evidence invariably will be admitted under section 2-

208(3) because the party seeking its admission, such as Selco in Problem Four204. U.C.C. § 2-208(3) provides: "Subject to the provisions of the next section on modification and waiver, such course of performance shall be relevant to show a waiver or modification of
any term inconsistent with such course of performance."
205. See, eg., Polycon Indus., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1316, 1324 (E.D. Wis. 1979);
Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Iowa 1976); Blue Rock Indus. v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 325 A.2d 66, 78-79 (Me. 1974); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175,
179-81, 552 P.2d 63, 65-66 (1976).
206. U.C.C. § 2-208(1).
207. See, e.g., A & G Constr. Co., Inc. v. Reid Bros. Logging Co., 547 P.2d 1207, 1212 n.3
(Alaska 1976).
208. See, e.g., Division of the Triple T Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 731-32,
304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 203-04 (Sup. Ct., Westchester County, 1969). See also Kirst, supra note 47.
209. The problem is reminiscent of the difficulties in harmonizing the § 1-205(4) requirement
that express terms "control" course of dealing and usage of trade with the charge in § 1-205(3) to
supplement agreements with evidence of course of dealing and usage of trade. See notes 47-53
and accompanying text supra.
210. Compare U.C.C. §§ 2-208(1) & (2) with § 2-208(3).
211. See, e.g., Blue Rock Indus. v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 325 A.2d 66, 78-79 (Me. 1974)
("Under section 2-208(3) of the Code, a course of performance inconsistent with any term of the
contract is relevant to show a waiver of that term under section 2-209.").
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teen, simply will couch its offer in terms of waiver rather than construction of
the writing. Although a subversion of the express langauge of section 2-208(1)
and (2), this result is consistent with overall Code policy of enforcing the parties' intent, whether evidenced by the agreement or by subsequent conduct.
Additional problems of interpretation exist in conjunction with section 2208. Section 2-208(3) expressly makes section 2-208 "subject" to section 2209.212 Thus, the section incorporates by reference all of the ambiguities of
section 2-209(4) and (5).213 If the parties' section 2-208 course of performance
constitutes a section 2-209(4) waiver, may the "waiver" be retracted under section 2-209(5) so that Buyco can require the fifth delivery to be made on time in
Problem Fourteen? Comment 3 to section 2-208 suggests that a course of per2 14
formance waiver can be retracted.
Assuming that a course of performance waiver can be retracted, is the
notice requirement to retract a waiver under section 2-209(5) the same whether
the waiver is a course of performance waiver or an "attempt at modification"
waiver under section 2-209(4)?215 Because an "attempt at modification"
waiver may constitute an actual agreement to modify that does not satisfy the
statute of frauds, perhaps its retraction should require more stringent notification than retraction of a course of performance.
PROBLEM FIFTEEN
In a writingsigned by both Selco andBuyco, Buyco ordersftve slush
freezersfor $10,000. The writing contains a clause stating that Selco
has agreednot to include certainpartsthat ordinarilyare sold with the
freezersfor an additional$400. Before delivery, Buyco orally orders

theparts,andSelco agreesto deliver them. Still before delivery, Buyco
notzifes Selco that it will not take the parts. Selco seeks damagesfor
Buyco's refusal to take the parts.
Under section 2-209(5) a waiving party can retract the waiver unless there
has been a material change of position by the other party in reliance on the
waiver that would make retraction unjust. 2 16 When the waiver has been materialy relied on and retraction would be unjust, the waiving party is estopped
212. But see Polycon Indus., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1316, 1324 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(court found that acceptance of late performance was a waiver under section 2-208, but did not
consider whether section 2-209(4) and (5) applied).
213. See text accompanying notes 170-203 supra; text accompanying notes 216-223 infra.
214. Accord, In re Humboldt Fir, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 292, 297-98 (N.D. Cal. 1977). The Comment assumes apriori that such an approach is necessary "to preserve the flexible character of
commercial contracts ..
" U.C.C. § 2-208, Comment 3.
215. See text accompanying notes 170-203 supra; notes 216-223 and accompanying text hyfra.
216. Section 2-209(5) provides:

A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the contract may

retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the other party that strict performance will be required of the term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in
view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver.
See, e.g., Ampex Corp. v. Appel Media, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1114, 1119-20 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Nora
Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Iowa 1976).
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to retract the waiver. 2 17 Although the section is unclear on the point, presumably retractable section 2-209(5) waivers consist of both section 2-209(4) "attempt at modification" waivers and common-law reliance waivers, which, as
we have said, should supplement the Code under section 1-103.218
Under the express terms of section 2-209(5) only a waiver can be retracted, not an enforceable modification agreement. Accordingly, assuming
that in Problem Fifteen the oral agreement on the parts is enforceable either as
a modification agreement or as a waiver,2 19 whether Buyco can "retract" its
order of the parts depends on which characterization of the transaction is correct. If an enforceable modification agreement has been made, Buyco cannot
retract; if the oral agreement is an attempt at modification that acts as a
waiver, or is a common-law waiver, Buyco can retract the waiver if section 2209(5) otherwise is satisfied. 220 Whether Buyco's order of the parts and Selco's
agreement to deliver them constitute an enforceable modification agreement
or a waiver depends on whether the transaction required a writing for enforcesection 2-209(3), which, unforability. That in turn depends upon interpreting
2 21
tunately, is simply not clear on the question.
If it is determined that Buyco's order of the parts and Selco's agreement
to deliver them constitute a common-law waiver or an attempt at modification
that acts as a waiver, Selco still can prevail in barring the retraction of the
waiver if it can demonstrate that it has materially changed position in reliance
on Buyco's waiver and that retraction would be "unjust." Presumably, a material change of position does not require actual performance by Selco, although performance usually should suffice. 222 Even if a "material change of
position" in reliance upon the waiver has occurred, under the curious language of section 2-209(5) a retraction of the waiver might not be "unjust."
Whether a "material change of position" in reliance upon a waiver has occurred and whether a retraction is "unjust" will be unclear in many cases,
the waiver or whether
making it difficult to predict whether a party can retract
223
the other party can stand on the contract as waived.
217. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 46.
218. Presumably reliance waivers without agreement are not displaced by § 2-209(4). See
note 184 and accompanying text supra.
219. The oral agreement could be unenforceable either as a modification agreement because
of failure to satisfy the writing requirement of § 2-209(3), or as a waiver, if § 2-209(4) were interpreted to require reliance on the waiver or consideration. See text accompanying notes 140-153,
170-193 supra.
220. See text accompanying note 223 infra.
221. See text accompanying notes 140-153 supra.
222. See note 175 supra.
223. The dilemma is similar to that faced by a contracting party attempting to determine
whether the other party has materially breached the contract so tat the injuredparty can cease its
own performance. See, e.g., Norrington v. Wright, 115 U.S. 188, 205-07 (1885). The problem is
even more difficult in the context of retraction of waiver, however, because not only must there be

a material change of position, but retraction also must be unjust. "Unjust" is hopelessly vague in
this context. See I STUDY, supra note 2, Doc. No. 65(c), at 647.
Section 2-209(5) requires a "reasonable" notice of retraction. What constitutes reasonable
notice is a question of fact for the jury. See, e.g., Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d
744, 749 (Iowa 1976). Notice of retraction of a waiver may be excused in some circumstances. See
id
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The Effect of an EnforceableModiflcation

PROBLEM SIXTEEN
On February15, Buyco andSelco enter into a written contractfor
the sale to Buyeo offive slushfreezersfor $2,000 each, with delivery on
March 15. On March 1, the partiesenter into an enforceable written
modfication of the price term and agree upon a price of $1,600 per
freezer. On March 15, Buyco refuses to accept delivery, and Selco
seeks loss of bargain damages. Selco claims that damages should be
determined accordingto a $2,000perfreezer contractprice.
At common law, whether Selco could recover damages based upon a
$2,000 contract price or upon a $1,600 contract price depended on whether the
224
March 1 agreement was an accord executory or an accord and satisfaction.
If the parties intended that the original contract would not be expunged-that
satisfaction would not occur-until the March 1 contract was satisfactorily executed, the March 1 contract would be termed an "accord executory," and, on
its breach, Selco could seek damages under the February 15 contract price of
$2,000. If the parties intended that the March 1 contract would supersede and
expunge the February 15 contract even before the execution of the March 1
contract, the March 1 contract would be termed an "accord and satisfaction,"
and, on its breach, Selco could seek damages only under the $1,600 price term
because the February 15 contract no longer would be enforceable. 22 5
The Code is silent on whether these common-law rules supplement section 2-209. Because the Code does not specifically displace them, 226 and because the rules are consistent with the purposes and policies of the Code to
enforce the intent of the parties, the rules should supplement section 2-209.227
The presumptions created by the common law for determining when the parties intended satisfaction to occur-when the modification was made or when
2 28
it was executed-also should survive the Code.
III.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

One of the principal "purposes and policies" of the U.C.C. is to provide a
framework of rules responsive to commercial realities and to give effect to the
intent of the parties when possible. 229 In light of the frequency with which
commercial parties alter their agreements, the Code approach to contract
modification must facilitate the enforcement of freely made alterations of
224. See text accompanying notes 95-98 supra.
225. See Hillman, supra note 96, at 565-66.
226. See note 183 and accompanying text supra; U.C.C. § 1-103.
227. See, e.g., Fratelli Gardino, S.P.A. v. Caribbean Lumber Co., 447 F. Supp. 1337, 1341-42
(S.D. Ga. 1978), afdinpart,587 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1979); Gorge Lumber Co., Inc. v. Brazier
Lumber Co., Inc., 6 Wash. App. 327, 493 P.2d 782, 787 (1972).
228. See RESTATEMENT oF CoNTRAcTS § 419 (1932).

229. See §§ 1-201(3), 1-201(11), 1-205, Comment 1, 2-208, Comment 1, 2-209, Comment 1.
"The concept of construing a commercial transaction in accordance with the parties' intent pervades the Code." Stewart-Decatur Security Sys. v. Von Weise Gear Co., 517 F.2d 1136, 1140 n. 11
(8th Cir. 1975). See also text accompanying note 148 supra.
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agreements in order to foster the policy of responsiveness to commercial practices. At the same time, the Code approach must contribute to the elimination
of coerced and fraudulent modification agreements. Instead of achieving these
goalh, the U.C.C. modification law is lost in a sea of confusing rules and overbroad principles.
The Code is not very helpful in explaining when the rules of contract
modification should apply. Because of the Code's failure to define modification, the potential exists for the application of section 2-209 to deny the enforcement of a contract term in situations in which a party is seeking simply to
enforce the original agreement. 230 Conversely, the potential exists for the failure to apply section 2-209 to uphold a modification in situations in which the
parties have intended to modify their agreement. 231 In addition, the Code's
approach to contract formation exacerbates the difficulties of determining
when the parties have formed a modification agreement. While the broad
contract formation rules are sensible in most contexts, they accentuate the
need for clear guidance on when the rules of contract modification should
apply.232 Finally, sections 1-107, 1-207, and 2-607(3)(a) of the Code further
confuse the already difficult task of determining whether a modification agreement has been made or whether a party has continued performance only to
2 33
minimize damages.
The Code should have defined a modification agreement as "the bargain
of the parties in fact to change a legal obligation that results from the parties'
original agreement." 234 This definition would aid in sorting out modification
issues from other issues. It also would clarify that the Code approach seeks to
enforce the intent of the parties as determined from their language and from
surrounding circumstances, and that the formal requirements of section 1-207
need not be satisfied to preserve rights upon going forward with performance.
The Code rules relating to the enforcement of modifications emphasize
the difficulties in harmonizing the need for certainty and flexibility in commercial legislation. Generally, the Code opted for a mix of broad principle and
specific rule, but the result may have impeded rather than fostered the enforcement of freely made modifications and the elimination of coerced modifications. The Code eliminates the need for additional consideration to support
modifications, and it attempts to police against coerced modifications through
the obligation of good faith performance. 235 The flexible approach of the
Code is helpful-the requirement of consideration at common law impeded
the enforcement of modifications that were voluntarily made. Nevertheless,
some guidance on the application of the principle of good faith performance in
the context of contract modification would have been helpful to ensure that
voluntary modifications are enforced and that coerced ones are not enforced.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See generally text accompanying notes 28-51 supra.
See general, text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
See generally notes 67-92 and accompanying text supra.
See generally text accompanying notes 94-109 & 166-68 supra.
See generally note 40 and accompanying text supra.
See general, text accompanying notes 111-126 supra.
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Perhaps the rules of economic duress should supplement the Code on the theory that the rules aid in defining the absence of good faith in modification
formation or that they are available under section 1-103.236
The modification statute of frauds and waiver provisions of section 2-209
may constitute the most serious shortcomings of the Code in the contract modification area. The Code apparently has balanced the need for flexibility and
certainty by requiring a written modification agreement when the parties have
included a provision barring oral modification in their original signed writing
or when the modification is "within" section 2-201, while permitting oral modification agreements to "operate" as waivers.23 7 The Code does not adequately define the proper roles for these provisions, thereby virtually enabling
the waiver proponent to assert that all oral modification agreements are enforceable under section 2-209(4). This Article suggests that in light of commercial practices to modify agreements informally, the goal of section 2-209 to
reduce technicalities, and the weaknesses of the statute of frauds, the statute of
frauds provisions should be interpreted restrictively, 238 and the waiver provision should be interpreted broadly.' 3 9 In addition, section 2-209(4) should not
preclude supplementation by estoppel principles. Under this approach, the
enforcement of freely made modifications can be accomplished, and the Code
goal of facilitating commercial practices and avoiding technicalities that hamper modification can be achieved.

236. See generally text accompanying notes 119-122 supra. See also Hillman, .upra note 15.
237. See Problems 10, 11, & 13 and accompanying text supra.
238. See text accompanying notes 146-149, 195-203 supra. See also Timbie, supra note 129, at
1575-76 (Statute of frauds "has failed to induce the parties to commit their agreements to writing;"
thus the policies supporting it have failed.).
239. See text accompanying note 203 supra. "The con.ept of 'waiver' is sufficiently flexible to
allow a court to justify its decision whenever a signed writing has allegedly been modified by a
later oral agreement." R. NORDSTROM, supra note 43, at 124.

